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For over two decades, the global community has endeavored to prevent and combat violent 
extremism. In that time, states and civil society partners have increasingly recognized 
women’s role in this effort as critical to its success. The effective engagement of women, 
representing half of the world’s population, is now understood as necessary to a “localized, 
credible, inclusive, and resonant strateg[y] to build resilience to extremism.”1  
However, gender-sensitive and gender-effective approaches to preventing and countering 
violent extremism (PCVE) have remained elusive. Women’s involvement in PCVE strategies 
continue to be largely marginal, often reinforcing harmful stereotypes, and sometimes 
resulting in negative consequences for gender equality. This is particularly true for women 
in minority ethnic and religious communities. The failure to effectively address the 
discriminatory impact of PCVE strategies on women not only hampers the efficacy of PCVE 
efforts but also impedes state party implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 2  which requires elimination of 
discriminatory laws, policies and programming. The failure to maximally engage women in 
PCVE efforts as leaders, designers, targets and partners also represents a lost opportunity 
to implement CEDAW Article 4 measures to accelerate women’s equality.  
The International Human Rights Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School conducted 
this study with support from United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. The goal of the study is to contribute to a better understanding of how PCVE 
strategies and programming can effectively protect and promote women’s human rights and 
principles of gender equality. The study involved in-country engagements with stakeholders 
in Tunisia, Kenya and the United States. Through these interviews and an extensive 
literature review, the report assesses how such initiatives have engaged and impacted women 





In each country, six categories of PCVE programs were reviewed:   
 
v Media campaigns present counter narratives that facilitate social disapproval of 
violent extremism. 
v Development programs are aimed at discouraging violent extremism by addressing 
economic motivations to join extremist groups, such as the provision of economic 
opportunities or professional skills development. 
v Direct interventions target populations considered to be “at-risk” of adopting 
violent extremist ideologies. 
v Community policing programs seek to improve the efficacy of the state security 
apparatus by improving relationships between communities and state security. 
v Community dialogue programs are aimed at improving the relationships between 
community members by creating forums for dialogue.  
v Capacity building focuses on improvement of individuals’ abilities to respond to 
violent extremism. 
v Assistance to returnee programs seek to reduce repeated participation of recruits 
by making it feasible to leave an extremist organization and reintegrate in community 
life. 
STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS  





























v Psychosocial support is provided to individuals and communities impacted by 
extremism. 
v Economic opportunities are created and developed for individuals impacted by 
extremism and at-risk of joining extremist movements. 
v Moderate and human rights-focused counter-narratives are presented to at-risk 
populations and societies more generally. 
v Moderate or alternative education is provided to make counter-narratives more 
accessible. 
v Training or capacity building is delivered on detection of extremist views. 
v Intra-community and intra-familial relations are improved through dialogue, 
relationship-building and leadership opportunities. 
v Professional skills are bolstered for at-risk and impacted populations to facilitate 
economic opportunities 
NEGATIVE OUTCOMES  
To determine the engagement of these programs with women and the impact on women, 




Review of these programs and the resulting negative outcomes yielded a set of 
recommendations for how countries and civil society partners can promote women’s actual 
equality in the context of PCVE. When designed with human rights and women’s equality in 
mind, PCVE programming can provide opportunities for women’s leadership and equality, as 
well as build a foundation for long-term and effective partnerships with impacted 






















1. Ensure a human rights approach in design, implementation and review of 
PCVE efforts that separates prevention from law enforcement. Employing a 
human rights orientation at the outset in designing a PCVE program sets the stage for 
non-discrimination and equality. Such an orientation is likely to be much more effective 
when prevention programming is separated from security oriented programming.  
When programs combine law enforcement with prevention goals, initiatives are less 
1. Employ a human rights approach that separates prevention from law enforcement.
2. Prioritize engendering and reforming the security sector prior to or in concert with
implementation of community policing programs.  
3. Support building resilient communities that are inclusive, promote equality and engage 
in dialogue to ensure interventions are effective and sustainable.
4. Avoid harmful gender stereotyping in program design even where such stereotyping 
may lead to short term gains.
5. Engage women as change agents and creative leaders in all forms of programming.   
6. Prioritize capacity building and education for sustainability.
7. Avoid instrumentalizing women which can undermine engagement and commitment as 
well as serve as a lost opportunity to promote equality.
8. Emphasize transparency, assessments and evaluations.
9. Reform discriminatory laws and policies that provide context for interventions.
10. Consider mechanisms for rehabilitation and reintegration for returnees as an 




effective and undermine community participation and relationships. If communities are 
only engaged within a security framework, they are less likely to see themselves as 
partners, and more as targets of the state.     
 
2. Prioritize engendering and reforming the security sector prior to or in 
concert with any community policing programming. Community policing 
programs are likely to be much more effective when implemented in a framework that 
seeks to engender and institute necessary human rights oriented reforms in the security 
sector. Women are nearly uniformly under-represented and relegated to the lower ranks 
of the security sector. Gender-mainstreaming in the security sector should be a top 
priority in establishing gender-effective PCVE strategies. This includes incorporating 
women in strategic security planning, as well as having female members of security 
forces. Similarly, practices in the security sector that do not comply with human rights 
standards, such as excessive use of force, should be addressed alongside community 
policing programs so as not to undermine community trust and engagement.  
 
3. Focus on building resilient communities that are inclusive, promote equality 
and engage in dialogue to ensure interventions are sustainable and effective. 
Violent extremism inevitably impacts the economic, social, cultural and political well-
being of an entire community. Program elements should encourage strong communities 
that protect community values and encourage recognition of women and girls as critical 
and equal voices by men and boys. This kind of programming can lay the groundwork 
for other more targeted prevention interventions and ensure communities can be equal 
partners in PCVE efforts in the long-term.  
 
4. Avoid counter-productive reliance on harmful stereotypes and traditional 
gender roles. Some PCVE programs rely on harmful stereotypes, such as equating 
women with motherhood or conceiving of them solely as victims. This kind of 
stereotyping provides “short-cuts” to determine appropriate stakeholders and 
anticipated roles. However, overreliance on such stereotyping can result in the 
promotion of counterproductive and limiting traditional conceptions of women’s proper 
roles and identity. While PCVE efforts may need to engage with the social and cultural 
roles women tend to play in many communities and families, they should do so in a 
thoughtful and reflective manner, aware of the costs and consequences to women’s 
equality, and, where possible, inclusive of program components that seek to challenge 
or question counterproductive stereotypes and traditional roles. 
 
5. Emphasize and promote women’s role as change agents and creative leaders. 
To fully engage women as change agents, it is imperative that women play leadership 
roles in program design and conceptualization. Doing so ensures programming benefits 
from women’s experience, knowledge and perspective about cultural, political, and 




with existing formal and informal women’s groups takes advantage of existing 
leadership within communities. 
 
6. Emphasize capacity building and education elements of programs. Effective 
capacity building and education provides tangible value to program targets and will 
promote effective programming. This programming is especially valuable to women who 
are often in vulnerable economic positions, underserved educational populations and 
disempowered politically.  These sorts of investments will have long-term returns and 
ensure women are able to contribute to PCVE efforts over time more and more 
effectively.  
 
7. Avoid instrumentalizing and marginalizing women’s rights. Instrumentalizing 
women can undermine their engagement and commitment and serve as a lost 
opportunity to promote equality. PCVE programs that incorporate women’s rights and 
interests are also more likely to succeed in engaging women and women’s organizations. 
Where PCVE programming engages women solely in order to utilize them as a means 
of collecting information, for example, they are less likely to successfully develop 
partnerships with women’s organizations if these organizations perceive women’s rights 
as subsidiary to security concerns. 
 
8. Emphasize transparency and ongoing evaluations of unintended 
discriminatory impacts of PCVE programming. Greater transparency regarding 
funding sources, recipients of funding, and the evaluation of how the funds are being 
used, and whether the programs were deemed effective, should be included in ongoing 
program evaluations. The efficacy of PCVE efforts is enhanced when women and girls 
are included in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Transparency and oversight 
also increases the efficient and effective use of funds. 
 
9. Address laws and policies that undermine a human rights approach to, and 
limit and compromise, community participation. Programs that promote women’s 
rights and maximize women’s leadership will face challenges in legal and political 
environments that limit women’s autonomy and/or fail to promote equality.  Similarly, 
laws that undermine human rights will limit or even render ineffective PCVE 
programming. PCVE efforts should support the passage and implementation of laws 
and policies that promote women’s equality, allowing women to act as change agents.    
 
10. Consider new approaches for returning participants in violent extremism, 
including rehabilitation and reintegration as an alternative to prosecution 
and incarceration. Programming should be developed to more effectively address the 
complex issues around returnees generally, and female returnees specifically. As more 
and more women are successfully recruited and return to their communities, there is 




community and social conditions that may have encouraged women to join extremist 
organizations and may now make it difficult or impossible for them to rejoin their peers. 
Overall, researchers found that PCVE programs that incorporate a human rights 
and gender sensitive and gender-effective perspective tend to do so primarily by 
promoting resilient communities based on principles of inclusion and equality as 






INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY3 
This study was conducted by the International Human Rights Clinic at the University of 
Chicago Law School (“IHRC”) with assistance from the United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”). The purpose of the study is to conduct a 
targeted assessment of best practices and strategies for protecting and advancing women and 
minority human rights in government and civil society efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent 
Extremism (“PCVE”). 4  The study reviews PCVE programs and initiatives in three 
countries—Tunisia, Kenya and the United States—to assess how these efforts have engaged 
and impacted women and, in the United States, minority groups more generally.5  
Researchers selected Tunisia, Kenya and the United States as countries of interest in 
consultation with OHCHR based on existing OHCHR and national level programs as well as 
accessibility of program information. The study reviews PCVE programs in Kenya and 
Tunisia for their engagement of and impact on women. The United States was selected for a 
broader analysis that includes assessment of PCVE programs and their impact on and 
engagement of women and minority communities. This was done primarily because of the 
nature of programs in the United States that implicitly and explicitly target communities 
based on ethnicity, race and religion. This practice has significant human rights implications.   
Through this study, researchers explore whether PCVE programs in Kenya and Tunisia 
advance or detract from the achievement of gender equality and whether women’s 
participation and leadership are maximized. Program reviews are qualitative but focus on 
the potential for six negative outcomes: (1) prompting backlash against targeted groups; 
(2) marginalizing targeted groups; (3) inadequately ensuring the participation of 
marginalized groups; (4) instrumentalizing the participation of marginalized groups; 
(5) relying on stereotypes; and (6) encouraging violent extremism among targeted groups. For 
the United States, researchers explore parallel issues in relation to the Muslim American 
community.  
This study utilizes both primary and secondary sources while applying qualitative research 
methodology for its analysis and findings. A comprehensive review of existing print and 
online sources, including newspaper articles, academic journals, country reports and other 
international human rights law sources was supplemented by primary data acquired through 
field research and interviews. On-site visits were conducted in Kenya and Tunisia from 
March 13–18, 2017, and primary research in the United States was conducted on an ongoing 
basis primarily through phone interviews with stakeholders. 
A structured qualitative interview approach was used in all three countries. A uniform 
questionnaire was designed to guide interviews and standardize information gathered. The 
questionnaire addressed the following topics: violent extremism and responses from relevant 
sectors; established PCVE programs, their goals and mechanisms; perceived effectiveness of 
programs, with a focus on the impact on and involvement of women and (in the United States) 




equality perspective; current or planned efforts to evaluate effectiveness and impact of 
programs on women and gender quality; and recommendations for improved approaches and 
strategies.  
For Kenya and Tunisia, interviewees were identified and contacted with the assistance of 
OHCHR country offices and their local partner organizations. IHRC conducted in-person 
interviews with individuals victimized by violent extremism and with individuals affiliated 
with civil society organizations that were either directly developing or monitoring PCVE 
programs. For the United States, interviewees were identified through the United States’ 
formal PCVE strategy, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States, as well as through an online survey of Countering Violent Extremism (“CVE”) 
programs and through programs funded by the Department of Homeland Security and the 
National Institute of Justice. Interviewees were contacted by email and phone. To preserve 
confidentiality of participating interviewees, only the date, location and organizational 
affiliations are identified in this report. Interview notes are on file with authors.  
WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND PCVE STRATEGIES     
Human rights protections have long been accepted as critical elements of PCVE strategies. 
Under the United Nations Global Terrorism Strategy developed at the 2005 World Summit, 
four primary pillars were identified as necessary to implement the strategy. 6  Pillar IV 
requires “measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the 
fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism”.7 The global commitment to engaging in 
PCVE strategies in a human rights-compliant manner has been reaffirmed repeatedly, most 
recently, by the U.N. High Commissioner of Human Rights in his 2016 annual report to the 
General Assembly.8 
This global commitment is compelled by core human rights treaties. Articles 18 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) protect freedom of thought and religion9 and Articles 19 affirm 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression.10 Under these sources of international human 
rights law, all policies and programs to prevent and counter violent extremism, especially 
those that involve the use of force, must adhere to  fundamental human rights principles that 
protect individual thoughts, opinions and speech, as well as a myriad of other human rights 
protections that protect the right to life, fair process and non-discrimination, among others.11  
More recently, a more specific focus on women’s human rights and the promotion of gender 
equality in the context of PCVE strategies has emerged, though effective and treaty-
compliant mechanisms remain unsettled. In late 2015, the U.N. Secretary-General released 
the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism 12  (“Plan of Action”) to ensure a 
comprehensive approach to violent extremism that “encompass[es] not only ongoing, 
essential[,] security-based counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventive 
measures.”13 The Plan of Action recommends that Member States “consider developing a 




governmental actors.15 In reference to gender equality and women’s rights16, the Plan of 
Action notes that “women’s empowerment is a critical force for sustainable peace”; that 
“women do sometimes play an active role in violent extremist organizations”; and that 
“societies for which gender equality indicators are higher are less vulnerable to violent 
extremism”.17 With these considerations as background, the Plan of Action recommends that 
member states:   
v ensure that the protection and empowerment of women is a central consideration of 
strategies devised to counter terrorism and violent extremism; 
v ensure that efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism do not adversely 
impact women’s rights;18 
v mainstream gender perspectives19 across efforts to prevent violent extremism; 
v invest in gender-sensitive research and data collection on women’s roles in violent 
extremism, including identifying the drivers that lead women to join violent extremist 
groups, and isolating the impacts of counterterrorism strategies on their lives, in order 
to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses; 
v include women and other underrepresented groups in national law enforcement and 
security agencies, including as part of counterterrorism prevention and response 
frameworks; 
v build the capacity of women and their civil society groups to engage in prevention and 
response efforts related to violent extremism; and 
v ensure that a portion of all funds dedicated to addressing violent extremism are 
committed to projects that address women’s specific needs or empower women, as 
recommended in the Secretary-General’s recent report to the Security Council on 
women, peace and security.20 
Despite these commitments, concerns remain that PCVE programming and strategies have 
failed to effectively implement measures that ensure women’s participation, promote 
women’s leadership and advance gender equality. In the 2015 UN Women Global Study on 
the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (“UN Women 
Study”), authors express concerns on the global approach to PCVE from a women’s rights 
perspective.21 The UN Women Study notes that while “[t]he UN human rights system has 
increasingly addressed the issue of gender and terrorism,” 22  there has been a “deeply 
problematic” shift in the frequency with which the Security Council has referred to women’s 
empowerment as “a mitigating factor to the spread of violent extremism”.23 The UN Women 
Study explains that “[t]o enmesh such programmes in [top-down] counterterrorism 
strategies, sanctioned by the Security Council, is to deeply compromise the role of women’s 
organizations and women leaders associated with the programmes”.24  
These concerns are also detailed in a 2016 report on Human Rights in the Context of 
Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism 




measures that target specific groups or individuals” and considers the link between violent 
extremism and gender.26 It details concerns about existing methods of involving women in 
PCVE programming, noting that: 
[c]ritics have observed that efforts to include women have tended to emphasize 
their engagement only at the informal or local level and often in ways that use 
and reinforce gender stereotypes (women as victims of terrorism; women as 
mothers). They also run the risk of instrumentalising women’s engagement, 
where women are empowered, educated or encouraged to participate only in 
furtherance of an agenda to counter or prevent violent extremism. If women’s 
rights become secondary to and identified with a broader agenda, the risks of 
backlash against gender equality, women’s rights defenders and girls’ 
education increases, as does the possibility of the bartering of women’s rights 
and gender equality when it is seen to further national security interests. 
Further, more attention needs to be paid to identifying if, and when, 
categorizing or documenting certain activities by women as countering or 
preventing violent extremism will be unsafe, unprincipled, or 
counterproductive.27 
OHCHR has expressed similar reservations in its Report on Best Practices and Lessons 
Learned on How Protecting and Promoting Human Rights Contribute to Preventing and 
Countering Violent Extremism (“Report on Best Practices”) in July of 2016. The Report on Best 
Practices calls for continuing “gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of 
radicalization for women and on their role in violent extremism.”28 It also notes that the 
efficacy of PCVE programs will be compromised without the “comprehensive engagement of 
women at all levels,”29 and that discriminatory PCVE programs may be counterproductive.30 
Finally, PCVE efforts that “emphasize women’s engagement in ways that have reinforced 
gender stereotypes,” may improperly instrumentalize women as “tools of national security,” 
or “[lead] to allocating . . . resources in a way that risks further marginalizing women.”31 The 
Report on Best Practices also notes a lack of assessments of PCVE measures for human rights 
violations, particularly those which may result in disparate impact along gender lines.32 
Amid these concerns, this study seeks to contribute to a better understanding of how PCVE 
strategies and programming can effectively protect and promote women’s human rights and 
principles of gender equality. No effective strategy to prevent or counter violent extremism 
can do so without the involvement of roughly half of the world’s population. The inclusion of 
women not only leads to a more comprehensive understanding of violent extremism but also 
leads to more “localized, credible, inclusive, and resonant strategies to build resilience to 
extremism.”33 Moreover, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) 34  mandates effective and reflective implementation of PCVE 
efforts that are gender-sensitive and gender-effective. Under CEDAW, state parties have 
committed to eliminating gender discrimination, including by “abolish[ing] all discriminatory 




organizations or enterprises.”35 Towards this end, parties to CEDAW must take affirmative 
measures to ensure and promote women’s equality.36 These commitments apply to all social, 
cultural, legal and economic PCVE strategies and initiatives, whether directly implemented 
by the government or with partners in civil society.      
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GENERAL FRAMEWORK: THEORIES AND DEFINITIONS 
DEFINING BASIC TERMS 
Violent extremism is a term widely used but its meaning is unsettled in the global 
community. 1  The United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), for 
example, defines violent extremism broadly as “advocating, engaging in, preparing, or 
otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic 
or political objectives.”2 The African Union Commission provides this description of how 
violent extremism operates:  
Terrorist groups exploit and capitalize on social grievances, unresolved 
conflicts, personal or community identity claims, religion, history, 
marginalization, exclusion and a host of other factors, to produce an ideological 
narrative that creates an enabling environment for recruitment and 
radicalization, where the commission of terrorist acts becomes appealing as an 
instrument of political activism.3 
The U.N. Human Rights Council (the “Council”) notes that violent extremism is often 
understood by the goals of violence, as it is “generally conceived of as aimed at achieving 
political, ideological or religious goals, or as the means employed by groups that reject 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”4  
Domestic legal definitions of “violent extremism” and related terms such as “terrorism” and 
“religious extremism” tend to vary by state. Some states focus on the behavior while others 
emphasize the political and/or religious motivation, such as whether the violence is motivated 
by opposition to “democracy.”5 In many states, the consequences of labeling an act as “violent 
extremism” and/or “terrorism” are often significant as this designation converts a domestic 
crime into a national security concern, often carrying heightened criminal penalties along 
with lessened constitutional and human rights protections for the alleged perpetrator. 6 
Labeling an act “violent extremism” or “terrorism” can also expand the types of behavior 
subject to criminal penalties. For example, where an act is “terrorist,” the violent act may not 
only be criminal but “incitement” to that act may as well.7 As the Council has observed, a 
“legal or policy framework that fails to clearly define the phenomenon it seeks to address not 
only risks leading to inefficient measures, but may also become harmful.”   
IDENTIFYING THE DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
There is significant debate as to why people resort to violent extremism and there is no 
definitive profile for susceptible individuals.8 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism stresses that “the path 
to radicalization is individualized and non-linear, with a number of common ‘push’ and ‘pull’ 




attract men and women to join groups; pull factors are the means by which groups recruit.10 
The U.N. Secretary-General has stressed that social, political and environmental factors 
foster violent extremism, including “poor governance, democracy deficits, corruption and a 
culture of impunity”11 and that violent extremist narratives become attractive where “human 
rights are being violated, good governance is being ignored and aspirations are being 
crushed.”12  
Academic studies on terrorism and violence identify both structural factors and social and 
psychological dynamics as potentially encouraging extremism; newer models emphasize 
ideology, globalization and religion as relevant as well.13 Below are five often discussed 
models that attempt to explain drivers of violent extremism: the material factors model, the 
rational choice model, the community norms model, the individual motivations model and 
the intragroup model.  These models provide a useful backdrop for assessing the efficacy of 
PCVE program implementation and programming and its engagement with gender-related 
goals.      
MATERIAL FACTORS MODEL 
The material factors model associates material deprivation—such as lack of economic 
opportunity, social marginalization and discrimination—with the risk of participating in 
violent extremism.14 The theory hypothesizes that lack of access to economic means and 
resources leads people to alternative methods of securing material goods, which may include 
participating in violent extremist groups that promise material gain. From a gender 
perspective, this model can provide some explanation for why women in particular, who often 
have more limited economic opportunities than men, could be drawn to extremist ideologies 
and group infrastructures, where such groups provide greater economic independence and 
opportunities for female leadership and autonomy.  
According to this model, violent extremism may be prevented by implementing programs that 
address structural economic inequalities.15 Programming aimed at eliminating recruitment 
of women would have to address economic inequalities resulting from gender discrimination. 
Successful programs could disrupt recruitment pathways for women by offering alternatives 
to their social and economic deprivation.     
Though this model has found support in various sectors, some sociological studies suggest 
that individuals who turn to violence are not necessarily more likely to have histories of 
deprivation, poverty or unemployment than the general population. 16 Moreover, numerous 
instances of violent extremism have been perpetrated by individuals with higher than 
average levels of education attainment.17 While this finding may not undermine the material 
factors model, it does indicate that the push and pull mechanisms are more complex than the 




RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL 
The rational choice model emphasizes the autonomy of the individuals who chose to engage 
in extremism. According to this model, extremists are among a minority who reject 
nonviolence in liberal democracies because civic engagement and legal mechanisms are 
ineffective, distrusted or time consuming.18 Thus, rather than committing violent acts in 
objection to material deprivation, violent groups act against a perceived injustice.19 Under 
the rational choice model, terrorist campaigns are meant to advance ideological ends by 
garnering attention, discrediting the government and demoralizing officials.20 Under this 
model, women may choose to participate in violent extremism in opposition to various 
perceived social injustices as a way of disrupting the existing social, political or economic 
order.    
COMMUNITY NORMS MODEL 
The community norms model posits that extremist beliefs are impacted and regulated by 
communities. There is no reliable evidence linking communities that express ideologies 
consistent with violent extremism to actual participation in violence.21 However, theories do 
indicate that the community may facilitate the continuation of violence, either through 
community approval or through material aid.22 Alternatively, if the community determines 
that violence is disproportionate or that violence creates suffering within the community 
itself, community opposition can also decrease incidents of violent extremism.23 Support for 
violent extremism in communities can fluctuate over time and depends on circumstances. At 
the start of conflicts, communities tend to have low levels of support for violence. This support 
may increase over time as narratives supporting violence are disseminated in the 
community.24 
Under this model, women’s engagement in PCVE efforts will likely be determined by the role 
they play in the community, such as whether they serve in leadership positions, have forums 
for expressing their views and are in dialogue with other community members.       
INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATION MODEL 
Some theorists view violent extremism as a decision made by the individual alone. 25 
However, as individual decisions are often influenced by others, vulnerability to violent 
extremism may still be linked to social isolation and marginalization.26  Under this theory, 
policies that promote social trust and political engagement are important in counteracting 
these factors. For example, while religious ideology is often assumed to be a reason for 
participating in violent extremism, studies indicate that Muslims with high attendance at 
religious centers are less likely to participate in violent extremism.27 Thus, the theory holds 
that ties and relationships to a religious community reduce the pull towards violent 




in PCVE will be linked to their participation and involvement in the public and religious life 
of a community as voices that influence others as well as to reduce their own isolation.    
INTRAGROUP MODEL 
The fifth model evaluating the factors that contribute to violent extremism focuses on 
intragroup dynamics. Violent extremist groups have a shared commitment and risk level, 
which creates solidarity in their articulated mission. 28 The development of insular groups of 
people dedicated to using violence generally leads to isolation and amplification of their 
shared beliefs and ends. This can be further reinforced by an intolerance of internal dissent.29 
As a result, particular groups will remain committed to violent ends, regardless of whether 
violence is achieving their goals. In such situations, violent extremism may continue to exist 
until the group itself is dismantled.30  Here, PCVE programs that assist women returnees in 
reintegrating into their communities are critical. For women considering leaving violent 
extremist groups, the difficulties of returning are likely important factors to consider. 
PCVE PROGRAM TYPES  
PCVE programming is often characterized as violence prevention in which future acts are 
countered by protective measures.31 The tension inherent in PCVE programming, then, is 
that targeted communities and individuals are seen both as vulnerable and as potentially 
violent.32 Thus, strategies tend to focus on building resilience in individuals and communities 
as well as addressing the tangible conditions that may drive violent extremism, as 
summarized above.  
PCVE strategies encountered by researchers generally took the following forms:  
Media campaigns sought to present counter narratives that facilitate social disapproval of 
violent extremism. 33  Those interviewed generally agreed that media campaigns could 
effectively deliver moderate messaging and education on social, religious or politico-legal 
topics which provide counter narratives to extremist ideology.34 However, some interviewees 
expressed some skepticism about the efficacy of media campaigns, 35  noting that some, 
primarily web-based efforts, had only been modestly successful as measured by clicks and 
other interactions.36 
Development programs aimed to discourage violent extremism by addressing economic 
motivations to join extremist groups, such provision of economic opportunities or professional 
skills development. When implemented in a gender sensitive manner, development programs 
have also sought to reduce power differentials and gender inequalities in a community, 
strengthening women’s ability to contribute to community PCVE efforts. 
Direct interventions targeted populations considered to be “at-risk” of adopting violent 
extremist ideologies. Some direct intervention programs also intervened where populations 




programs usually operated by providing psychosocial support, such as counseling or 
mentoring, and social and cultural opportunities, particularly for youth.37 Some provided 
economic opportunities such as vocational skills training.   
Community dialogue programs aimed to improve the relationships between community 
members by creating forums for dialogue. The goal was to encourage examination of 
extremist narratives by providing opportunities for community self-education. These 
programs sought to offer a platform for participants to express their opinions and ideas, 
which is thought to improve the psychosocial well-being of community members. 
Community policing programs sought to improve the efficacy of the state security 
apparatus by improving relationships between communities and state security. When police 
and policed communities have cultivated a relationship based on mutual knowledge and 
respect, the legitimacy of the former and the human rights of the latter are strengthened. A 
concern is that community policing programs are sometimes security-oriented, rather than 
community-oriented; in such a situation, interventions are actually crafted to provide police 
with access to a community, rather than to foster community-police relationships.  
Capacity building focused on improvement of individuals’ abilities to respond to violent 
extremism. Some programs focused on providing economic opportunities necessary for local 
actors to effectively execute their programs. Other programs focused on developing 
professional skills. 
Assistance to returnee programs sought to reduce repeated participation of recruits by 
making it feasible to leave an extremist organization and reintegrate into community life. 
Programs that provided assistance to returnees included those providing psychosocial 
support, presenting counter-narratives, offering moderate education, or delivering economic 
opportunities to address the multitude of pull factors that might be exerting their influence 
on returnees. 
PCVE PROGRAMS GOALS 
The PCVE program interventions described above generally seek to accomplish seven 
primary goals, which can work in concert: providing psychosocial support, providing economic 
opportunities, presenting counter-narratives, providing moderate education, detecting 
extremism, improving community relations, and developing professional skills. Keeping these 
goals in mind is useful in assessing gender equality and impact on women’s participation, 
experience and empowerment in PCVE programming.  
Psychosocial support aims to create buffers for at-risk populations to discourage them 
from engaging in extremism by providing social connections and needed resources. For 
instance, at-risk youth may be assigned mentors, and women affected by extremist activities 




Counter-narratives provide alternative descriptions that reinterpret social, religious and 
philosophical ideologies in a way that discourages rather than encourages extremism. For 
instance, representing religious text in such a way that emphasizes peaceful resolutions of 
conflict or condemns the use of violence can offer an alternative to extremist religious 
interpretations.  
Moderate education discourages extremism by providing knowledge about civic matters 
such as good governance and an analytical and informed approach to religion. Education 
seeks to put in place and operationalize other goals as well, such as presenting counter 
narratives. 
Detecting extremism serves law enforcement and deterrence purposes. This is most 
frequently done through law enforcement, intelligence gathering and profiling characteristics 
that can lead to participation in violent extremism.    
Professional skills development provides or facilitates professional opportunities and 
capacity of those who are at-risk of adopting violent extremist ideologies, as well as 
communities impacted by extremism, in order to reduce their vulnerability to extremism. 
While capacity building usually seeks to improve access to political structures and 
community organizations, skills development cultivates individual skills, including those 
relevant to the labor market and to politics. Some programs may provide economic 
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THE IMPACT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON WOMEN 
Violent extremism has significant negative and broad-ranging consequences for affected 
communities. It can increase social insecurity; compel governments to redirect resources 
needed from social services to law enforcement; erode public and government will to prioritize 
human rights; and stigmatize and marginalize affected communities.1 Violent extremism can 
also restrict individual enjoyment of a number of basic human rights, including the rights to 
life, liberty, physical integrity, participation in public life and freedom of movement, as well 
as the rights from all forms of violence, including sexual violence, enslavement and forced 
pregnancy.2 It can also have a marked socio-economic impact on communities by preventing 
children from attending school, placing additional burdens on a country’s health system and 
undermining social and economic development efforts.3  
The economic impacts, alone, of violent extremism are great: the direct and indirect cost of 
violent extremism to the world was estimated to be about $53 billion in 2014.4 Some countries 
are more impacted than others. For example, foreign direct investment in Nigeria dropped 
by $6.1 billion in 2010 in response to increased incidences of terrorism in the country.5  
Negative psychological effects related to violent extremism have also been documented, 
including post-traumatic stress disorder, difficulty concentrating, trouble sleeping and 
feelings of irritability and anger.6 After the attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United 
States, studies found an increased use of alcohol, tobacco products and illicit drugs in the 
United States population.7 Even more generally, after acts of violent extremism, people tend 
to alter their routines and normal activities because they may fear another attack.8 In this 
way as well, violent extremism undermines a community’s sense of well-being, cohesion and 
security.9 
Violent extremism can also have a devastating effect on minority groups and vulnerable 
individuals. 10  For example, youth often experience a sense of disenfranchisement and 
marginalization which leaves them vulnerable to violent extremism as both perpetrators and 
victims.11 As this report explores, in the United States, Muslim communities have been 
subjected to discrimination and increased surveillance following acts of violent extremism in 
the country.  
Similarly, women are impacted by violent extremism in unique and problematic ways. 
Violent extremism can exacerbate the negative consequences of gender-based discrimination 
by, for example, placing even greater responsibilities on women for reproduction and 
maintenance of families when male family members are recruited by extremist organizations. 
Extremist ideologies and practices, themselves, often promote patriarchal structures and 
traditional conceptions of women’s proper roles, which undermine women’s equality.12  Some 
studies have suggested that gender inequality and “violent” conceptions of masculinities are 
at the core of violent extremism13 and that women’s subjugation is used as a tool by extremist 
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groups to reinforce traditional stereotypes of masculinity.14 Along these lines, numerous 
instances of gender-based violence by extremists have been reported. 15  For example, 
extremist groups have lured young girls into leaving their homes to become the wives of 
extremist leaders; Nigerian schoolgirls have been kidnapped, brainwashed and coerced into 
becoming suicide bombers; and Yezidi women and girls have been enslaved, sexually abused 
and traded like chattel.16 Women have been raped and assaulted by extremist groups in 
retaliation for their family members not joining extremist groups.17  
These conceptions and practices, in combination with other extremist practices of forced 
illiteracy and restrictions on freedom of movement, 18  can create significant barriers to 
women’s equality in the economic, political, social and personal spheres.19 The Section below 
highlights some particular areas of impact noted by researchers in Tunisia, Kenya and the 
United States.     
WOMEN AND FAMILIES 
Violent extremism can have a significant detrimental impact on families and individual 
members. Families may fall into economic distress when wage earning members join 
extremist organizations or are the victims of violent extremist activities.20 This, in turn, 
negatively impacts children’s academic performance or results in children dropping out of 
school to assist the family economically.21 Recruitment of family members can cause family 
conflict and alienation because of conflicting ideologies and paths.22 Conversely, families are 
also vulnerable to “kinship recruitment,” meaning that multiple family members are more 
vulnerable to joining an extremist group once one member of the family has been recruited.23 
A recent survey of 474 foreign fighters, comprised of both male and female fighters from 25 
Western countries, found that one-third have a familial connection to violent extremists, 
whether through relatives or marriage.24 Similarly, families can lose community support and 
resources as a result of stigmatization 25  and can be targeted by government security 
interventions. 26  Family members may become traumatized by acts of extreme violence, 
causing mental health or emotional difficulties that may affect family dynamics. 27 
Emotionally, loss of a family member to a violent extremist group can cause a profound sense 
of grief: sorrow at the loss of a child or husband; guilt at what they may have done or might 
do in the future; and shame in the face of hostility from friends and neighbors.28 Some 
research suggests that wives of suspected violent extremists compensate by deciding to 
“accept their fate,” and seek to separate themselves from the activities of their husbands or 
other family members.29   
Women, while increasingly the object of recruiting efforts, are still often most impacted by 
the loss of male family members and the consequences of that loss. They may experience 
heightened stress and anxiety due to family dissolution, as women often bear greater 
responsibilities in maintaining and protecting family cohesion and well being. These 
consequences range from grief over loss of their children to social isolation to descent into 
poverty due to a lack of economic opportunities available to women. 30  Women whose 
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husbands have joined extremist organizations are more likely to experience the economic 
consequences of poverty than men in a similar position.31 Because of discriminatory laws, 
unequal compensation and the underrepresentation of women in employment, women 
struggle to serve as primary wage earners for their families after men have left. This, 
combined with the stigmatization from the community, makes it extremely difficult for 
women to effectively act as heads of households under these circumstances.      
 
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS 
As noted, women whose children are recruited by violent extremists appear to often bear the 
burden of attempting to keep their families together. According to a community organizer in 
Tunisia, mothers often try to keep in contact with children who have left to join violent 
extremist groups, often acting in opposition to their husbands and risking alienation from 
family members who disown and distance themselves from the foreign fighters.32 These 
women often seek help from community organizations for assistance in finding their lost 
children.33 Both mothers and fathers have attempted to track down children who have left 
Tunisia, to reunite with them and have them return home.34 
In Tunisia, reports indicate that family members sometimes distance themselves from 
individuals accused of violent extremisms because the accused are often targeted by police 
and government security forces.35 Families of the accused can be targeted by the security 
sector through arbitrary raids, detentions and questionings.36 Tunisian authorities often 
place the families of returning foreign fighters under surveillance.37 Similar behavior was 
reported in Kenya, where security forces monitored, interrogated and investigated families 
and friends of those accused of violent extremism or those closely associated with extremist 
groups.38  
Kenyan groups noted that when family members joined extremist groups, other members, 
including women, were sometimes influenced to join as well. Some were possibly motivated 
by a desire to be reunited with their missing family members,39 especially when government 
officials did not assist when loved ones disappeared.40 Other groups suspected women felt an 
obligation to join their husbands, embracing the ideology that wives should follow their 
husbands.41 
WOMEN AND COMMUNITIES 
Entire communities can be targeted by law enforcement because individuals from the 
community have joined extremist groups.42 Police profile these communities and engage in 
heightened security activities including arbitrary raids, house arrests, 43 detentions44 and in 
some extreme cases, extra-judicial killings.45  
Increased surveillance, restrictions and government control alter the dynamics and health of 
a community. Studies suggest that the mere presence of a weapon increases aggressive 
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behavior in people.46 The militarization of law enforcement may create a “warrior mentality” 
in the police against the community they are supposed to serve. 47  In turn, community 
members tend to view the police as unfair and disrespectful. This corrodes the community’s 
views of the legitimacy of policing and broader governmental authority and can lead to 
community members’ withdrawal from social regulation and political life.48 
Apart from increased contact with the security sector, communities suffer when members 
leave to join violent extremist groups. The social structure and labor market and, more 
generally, the political and economic infrastructures are negatively impacted.49 For example, 
there are immediately fewer workers in the community and therefore less economic 
development. Women may be particularly impacted by community disruption. Those 
affiliated with family members who join violent extremist groups may experience 
stigmatization and community ostracization, which can have severe negative social, economic 
and psychological impacts.50 Those women who relied on the foreign fighters for their income, 
including their families or their employees, are likely to experience even greater economic 
stress. 51  While this has not been thoroughly researched, studies suggest that women 
experience higher rates of domestic violence when their families are in economic distress.52  
 
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS 
In Tunisia, Amnesty International has reported that police conducted over 1,880 raids in 
2015 aimed at violent extremists in the country. Police forcibly entered homes without 
properly identifying themselves or presenting a warrant or judicial order and proceeded to 
point guns at residents.53 Those arrested during the raids included many elderly and ill 
individuals, and even those who were not arrested suffered consequences: some elderly had 
medical reactions and children reported being terrified and in shock.54 Some communities in 
Tunisia lost more than 30 members overnight because they left to join extremist groups 
together.55 As a result of this activity, several businesses and community buildings shut 
down.56  
In Tunisia, women associated with foreign fighters are often viewed with distrust and 
judgment. 57 Similarly, in Kenya, women who are left behind when male family members 
leave to join violent extremist groups are ostracized from society and stigmatized by 
community members.58 This is due, in part, to government measures that target the families 
of foreign fighters.59 “Women left behind” often do not leave their homes for long periods of 
time because of feelings of isolation and shame.60  
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 WOMEN AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
Violent extremism impinges on women’s freedom of religion. Because many extremist groups 
advance violent ideologies as religious ideals,61 government reactions have sometimes been 
to restrict religious freedoms when there is any suspicion of extremism. For example, various 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa region that have experienced high levels of 
terrorist attacks have also experienced high levels of government restriction on religion.62 In 
2014, among the world’s 25 most populous countries, three of the five states with the highest 
overall restrictions on religion were in the Middle East and North Africa region: Egypt, 
Pakistan and Turkey.63 Violent extremist groups themselves are criticized for being abusers 
of religious freedom—often attacking minority religious groups in their regions.64 Human 
rights activists worry that restrictions of freedom of religion or belief will lead to an overall 
dissipation of human rights because freedom of religion is closely tied to freedom of 
association, peaceful assembly, opinion and expression, which are foundational to democratic 
societies.65 
Restrictions on freedom of religion limit women’s right to freely choose their dress and other 
expressions of their faith. In 2014, for example, a court in Kazakhstan held that a preschool 
was within its rights when it prohibited a young girl from wearing a hijab because it violated 
the school’s dress code; the girl’s parents removed her from the school.66 The same year, in 
the Czech Republic, a school of nursing banned women from wearing headscarves in class, 
prompting at least two women to leave the school.67 In both of these countries, restrictions 
on religion not only constrained women’s right to express their faith through their dress, but 
also interfered with their right to education, and with that, their ability to participate in 
society on a basis equal to men. 
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS 
Research exploring cultural attitudes in Tunisia suggests that, while “Tunisians are now 
generally very tolerant of religious dress that might be considered moderate, like the hijab 
. . . the vast majority of citizens describe themselves as still ‘completely against’ the wearing 
of more dramatic religious attire like the niqab.”68 Even men have reported “shaving off their 
beards, eschewing traditional gowns, and limiting mosque visits to avoid harassment by 
police who they fear will sweep up anyone who even looks militant.”69 In Kenya, reports 
indicate that police profile those who look Muslim and ask women who wear headscarves to 
remove them at security check points.70  
Some Tunisian women, on the other hand, report feeling fearful of retaliation for not wearing 
the hijab or for dressing in ways that might not be perceived as modest in Tunisia. One 
woman reported to Slate Afrique that “[s]ocial pressure to put back on the hijab is huge, 
especially in the less privileged classes.”71 This was echoed in some of the interviews in 
Tunisia, where women expressed that they had been harassed on the street for not wearing 
a head scarf.72 The Pew Research Center reported in 2016 that “Tunisia is the only country 
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in the Arab world and Africa where women report being harassed for dressing too liberally 
and too conservatively.”73  
WOMEN RECRUITS 
Women who join extremist groups appear to do so for a multitude of reasons. The traditional 
perception is that women leave to participate in “sexual jihad”, an alleged practice in which 
women supposedly travel to conflict zones in order to volunteer sexual services to jihadists.74 
Some reports speculate that women join to bear children and produce large families who can 
be indoctrinated with extremist beliefs.75  
Reports also differ as to whether women join freely or under coercion or duress. In some 
profiles, young women appear to have been lured or deceived by extremists to join their 
cause. 76  Others may have already been outcasts in conservative society—by having a 
miscarriage, getting a divorce or having been raped—and extremists provide them with a 
community and a way to escape by suicide if they want to move on to a better afterlife.77 
However, while these reports focus on women victimized and deceived, there are also reports 
that well-educated, independent women are leaving to join extremist groups voluntarily. 
Some have speculated that these women, who have been described as “feminist jihadists,”78   
do so to assert their own personal freedom and autonomy.79 Others believe that most women 
who join extremist groups have either experienced trauma or are marginalized in their home 
countries.80 Still others posit that women join extremist groups for the same reasons as 
men.81 
Reports indicate that extremists are changing their recruitment strategies of women to 
engage them more effectively, sometimes opening more significant roles to women. This may 
explain why more university educated women could be joining extremist groups.82 There are 
a few reasons offered about why extremist groups might want to recruit more women. First, 
women do not arouse as much suspicion as men.83 They are rarely subject to full body 
searches and can more easily hide weapons in their clothing.84 Second, extremist groups need 
more people in general and they may not be able to discriminate based on gender.  Third, 
extremist groups may be actively trying to change their image to show that they do believe 
in some form of equality between the sexes.85  Fourth, it is likely that women extremists get 
more media attention for their acts of violence than men, which can have benefits for violent 
extremist groups that want to publicize their actions.86 
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS 
In Tunisia, the government has estimated that between 100 to 700 women have left for 
“sexual jihad,” but civil society organizations estimate that it is closer to 300 or 400.87 The 
perception that women are only leaving for sexual reasons seems to have diminished over 
time. Stakeholders interviewed by researchers described women as now actively 
participating in extremist activities, sometimes by warning extremists of authorities, 
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recruiting other members in person or online, assisting with information technology and 
computers, or simply actively participating in violent actions.88   
Women from Tunisia and Kenya, like men, are often recruited through social media. 89 
Reports indicate that women are also recruited by friends and through relations in mosques 
as well. It is also common for women to be recruited by members of their family; once one 
member of the family is recruited, organizations have an easier time recruiting 
other members of the family to join.90 Often, young women are thought to join extremist 
groups because they are in relationships with extremists (and may or may not know their 
true identities)91 or because the extremists offer them large dowries.92 In Kenya, Universities 
are new sites of recruitment for women, and extremists use ideological arguments to appeal 
to well educated, middle class young women. 
WOMEN RETURNEES  
While research is sparse, various theories have been offered for why women leave extremist 
groups. At least one study has suggested that disappointment in leadership is often a 
motivating factor.93 Some stakeholders offered that women may become disenchanted with 
the ideology; especially given that they are required to live in communities that restrict their 
rights and autonomy.94 Others may return because their husbands or other family members 
were captured or killed.95 They may also return simply because their groups have been 
defeated in the regions where they were stationed.96 Experts have indicated that those who 
do return are likely not threats to their home countries.97 If the violent extremist groups 
knew that they were leaving the group to return to their home countries, they would likely 
face extreme punishment such as death; it has been reported that the Islamic State (also 
“ISIS,” “ISIL,” or “Daesh”) had executed 116 foreign fighters because they wanted to return 
home.98  
Regardless, many countries have created legal regimes that place returning foreign fighters 
under increased security. For example, the UK has a new anti-terrorism law that allows the 
government to seize passports and travel documents for 14 days from dual nationals at 
borders when terrorism related activity is suspected.99 The government may also cancel 
passports and place suspected terrorists immediately onto no-fly lists. 100  Other western 
countries have also focused on constraining freedom of travel and restricting foreign fighters 
from coming back into their home countries.101 The Netherlands reserves the right to revoke 
the citizenship of convicted dual-national terrorists and Germany permits the government to 
confiscate any and all travel documents should a person be suspected of posing a national 
security threat.102 Many countries also have laws criminally punishing people for joining or 
participating in violent extremist activities, so many returning foreign fighters may be 
incarcerated.103 Countries like Belgium, France, Norway, and Germany have all detained 




Returning fighters are often the subject of increased security and surveillance upon return. 
Those detained are often isolated or restricted in their contact with other detainees to allay 
concerns that they will develop relationships with other returnees and become increasingly 
radicalized. In 2015, for example, Tunisia passed an updated antiterrorism law, in the wake 
of the attack on the Bardo National Museum, which “extend[ed] some police powers such as 
pre-trial detention time, and lift[ed] a halt on [the] death penalty.”105 The law grants security 
forces broad and vague monitoring and surveillance powers, extends incommunicado 
detention from 6 to up to 15 days for terrorism suspects, during which time the suspects 
cannot see a lawyer or family members, and will not be put in front of a judge, and permits 
courts to close hearings to the public and allows witnesses to remain anonymous to the 
defendants.106  
When returning women are imprisoned and ultimately released, they may face additional 
challenges as compared to their male counterparts. First, while in detention, all women 
prisoners experience higher rates of physical and sexual abuse before entering prison, along 
with higher rates of mental health problems and dependency on drugs and alcohol. 107 
Because of their increased risk factors, women are more likely than men to attempt suicide 
in prison.108 They also require a wider range of health services than men because of their 
reproductive needs like menstruation and pregnancy.109 In some countries, women in prison 
are particularly vulnerable to humiliation and sexual abuse within prisons, both by guards 
and by male inmates.110  
When exiting prison, women face particular challenges because of the lack of economic 
opportunities compounding often strained family ties and the negative stigma they face in 
their communities. In addition to transitioning into life outside prison, some women who have 
left a violent relationship will have to establish a new life, which will bring with it additional 
economic, social and legal difficulties.111 Women are more likely than men to have been 
treated for mental health problems in prison and thus often require treatment or counselling 
after release.112 In certain countries, women released from prison are also at risk of murder 
by their families, if they have been convicted of “moral offences,” or are the victims of rape or 
other sexual abuse.113   
Some countries do focus on rehabilitation and reintegration for returning foreign fighters, 
though researchers did not encounter programs that targeted female returnees.114 Countries 
with rehabilitative regimes for returning foreign fighters, include: Indonesia, 115  Saudi 
Arabia, 116  Denmark, 117  and Pakistan. 118  Indonesia, for example, has adopted a “soft-
approach” strategy which engages returning fighters, providing counseling and incentives as 
well as facilitate contact with the detainee’s families.119 Indonesian rehabilitation centers 
assist those convicted of violent extremist activities in starting new lives by helping them to 
set up businesses, enrolling their children in government schools, and giving them access to 




In Tunisia, public attitudes appear to support the treatment of female returning foreign 
fighters like their male counterparts, regardless of whether their recruitment involved 
coercion. For example, organizations that service victims of violence do not appear to consider 
female foreign fighter returnees part of their mandate.121 This may be the case even when 
the woman was subjected to forms of coercion and deceit or may have experience sexual 
and/or physical abuse by a foreign fighting extremist organization. 122  Service providers 
expressed concern that these returnees may have continued involvement in violence and so 
were reluctant to provide them assistance.123 In Kenya, the public perception is similar, and 
many female returning foreign fighters face extreme societal isolation and often experience 
post-traumatic stress syndrome symptoms.124  
In Kenya, returning foreign fighters may face difficulties from both the government and 
violent extremist groups. Disappearances of foreign fighters have been documented and some 
human rights organizations have found evidence that the government is involved in these 
disappearances.125 This practice seems to affect both female and male returning foreign 
fighters. In Kenya, Human Rights Watch reports that 6 of the 34 documented disappearances 
and 1 out of the 11 documented extra-judicial killings were women.126  
In Tunisia, there is very little public information about what happens to female foreign 
fighters after the return from abroad. There have been reports that returning fighters have 
been imprisoned immediately after returning to the country, deprived of many of their due 
process protections.127 There are estimates that currently over 1,500 returning fighters are 
in prison.128 While it appears almost all returning foreign fighters are housed in one prison, 
it is unclear if women are also housed in this same prison when they return as well.129 
Alternatively, women returning fighters may be housed in a women’s prison in Tunisia.130 
There appears to be no conclusive evidence that female returning foreign fighters are 
imprisoned rather than interrogated and released.131 
More generally, women in prison in Tunisia often face barriers to caring for their children.132 
Children are able to stay with their incarcerated mothers until the age of three. Prisons do 
not always have the adequate amount of supplies for children; there are often food, clothing, 
and diaper shortages. There is often inadequate nutrition for prenatal mothers as well. In 
Kenya, detained women are not allowed to receive any health services or to meet with any 
family or outside representatives.133    
Women returnees face various forms of stigmatization and marginalization. This is especially 
the case for women who return with children who may be a result of a relationship or sexual 
abuse. 134  Their communities and families may disown them. 135  Children born during 
extremist activities may also have stigma attached to them.136 In Kenya, women involved 
with Al-Shabab who have returned from Somalia pregnant or with HIV are often stigmatized, 
and are unlikely to receive support from services or their communities.  
34 
 
WOMEN’S LIVELIHOODS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING  
The economic impact of violent extremism on women is a complex issue and likely varies by 
context.  Generally, because women fare worse than men economically, economic incentives 
and consequences of violent extremism are likely heightened for women. Globally, women 
are still lagging behind men in terms of labor force participation,137 and even in countries 
where the participation approaches equality, women still earn less than men for performing 
the same work.138    
As noted above, the connection between violent extremism and economic opportunities is 
highly debated. There is some evidence that there is a connection between unemployment in 
a community and recruitment and radicalization.139 Violent extremist groups use economic 
influences to encourage both men and women to join. For example, extremist groups often 
pay people for material assistance, through provision of food or payment of salaries for 
recruits.140  
As noted above, because women suffer from more limited economic opportunities, they may 
be more responsive to economic incentives offered by extremist groups. Examples provided 
below from Tunisia and Kenya indicate that some of the motivation from women recruits was 
financial stability and opportunity. As mentioned, women who are left behind by their family 
members who leave to join extremist groups often struggle to support themselves and their 
family. 141  Thus, the incentive of economic opportunities may become even more powerful 
when male recruits have left families and communities in economic distress. Women may see 
joining an extremist organization as the only way to support dependents given limits on other 
income-generating options.142  
Finally, violent extremism may cause diversion of government resources or losses in certain 
industries which may also impact women’s lives. For example, government resources directed 
towards extremism may be diverted from other sectors such as social services and education. 
Also, some countries seen as harboring extremists may experience damage to certain 
industries. Both reduction of social services and loss of jobs in the informal and low-wage 
sector will have a negative impact on women’s lives.   
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS 
Violent extremist groups use economic opportunities as a tool for recruitment, sometimes 
employing coercion or deception. In Kenya, for example, there have been reports of a boy who 
was tricked into going to the Middle East with a lure of an income opportunity. When he 
arrived, he was taken to fight for a violent extremist group instead; he has apparently been 
missing for 3 years now.143  Similar stories have circulated concerning women. In some 
reports, violent extremist groups promised high dowries to women in need of money.144      
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Tunisia is a good example of a country impacted negatively by the mere perception that it is 
vulnerable to terrorism. For example, in the wake of the Sousse beach attacks,145 the United 
Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office “advise[d] against all but essential travel to 
. . . [most of] Tunisia.” 146  British tourism subsequently declined by 90 percent. 147  The 
economic impact here cannot be understated: the BBC estimates that 15.2 percent of 
Tunisia’s GDP consists of travel and tourism, and that 13.8 percent of all employment is 
based in these sectors.148 The Tunisian government has, accordingly, “plead” with the United 
Kingdom to “relax its travel advice.”149  
If the economic incentives theory holds true, this negative economic impact caused by a 
perception of violent extremism in a country may then have the adverse effect of increasing 
extremism in a country such as Tunisia.150 As noted above, women may be disproportionately 
affected by poor economic conditions that are exacerbated by extremism.      
WOMEN AND THE ABSENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS  
PCVE efforts often lead to human rights violations, including restrictions on free speech and 
religion, curtailments of due process rights, and extra-judicial killing and torture.151 Women 
suffer when communities loosen protections for human rights; human rights violations 
contribute to insecurity and instability, which then often leads to more human rights 
violations.152 Moreover, because of gender inequality and discrimination, women experience 
compounded forms of discrimination when other factors such as age, ethnicity, disability or 
socio-economic status, make them even more vulnerable to human rights violations.153 
The right to personal autonomy encompassed in the rights to life, freedom of movement, 
privacy and expression is often restricted for women, in particular, as a result of violent 
extremism. Personal autonomy, which has been defined as “the desire to experience choice 
and psychological freedom,”154 can include the ability to make choices for one’s self, including 
choices about beliefs, dress, travel and association.155 One prominent example of women’s loss 
of personal autonomy is limitations placed on their choice of attire, especially religious attire 
worn by Muslim women. Many countries have already banned some form of Muslim religious 
dress, and many others are contemplating similar restrictions; these restrictions not only 
impact women’s choice of attire but also their ability to participate in public life.156 Unable to 
dress in a manner consistent with their religion and culture, women may feel compelled to 
withdraw from public spaces. Other potential personal freedoms that can easily be abridged 
by programs aimed at preventing violent extremism include travel bans and restrictions, 
controls on financial transactions and curtailment of freedom of association and speech.157 
In addition to individual freedoms that may be restricted, when a government becomes more 
restrictive for security reasons, women’s equality may be compromised as governments tend 
to constrict the activities of women and the activities of those organizing for equality.158 Just 
like restricting freedom of religion is often a knee-jerk reaction to violent extremism, many 
governments have also restricted freedom of association in response to violent extremism.159 
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Many counterterrorism laws have included very broad definitions of terrorism and illegal 
activity, and therefore have been used for the direct and indirect targeting of women’s rights 
organizing, women’s rights organizations, and women’s human rights defenders.160 Some 
salient examples from Tunisia are described below.   
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS 
In Tunisia, various enacted laws and policies have curtailed women’s freedom and even more 
under consideration threaten to do so. As an example, the Tunisian legislature reviewed a 
bill in 2014 to “introduce stricter controls on the niqab.”161 According to the Ministry of 
Interior, such controls were necessary because “suspects and fugitives deliberately wear 
niqab for disguise and to escape from security units.” 162 Proposed legislation would have 
banned the niqab in public places.163 Regardless of whether such a law reflects a legitimate 
effort of the government to identify and detain suspects of violent extremism, it raises 
concerns for women from a human rights perspective. 164 For example, though the law targets 
the niqab, the justification provided by the government indicates that all forms of dress that 
could be used as disguise (sunglasses, hats) should be subject to the same regulation. 
Moreover, Article 1 of CEDAW requires states to take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women, including laws that have a discriminatory impact on women. 
Thus, this law would likely be in violation of Tunisia’s obligations under CEDAW. 
In 2015, Tunisia passed an updated antiterrorism law, which “extend[ed] some police powers 
such as pre-trial detention time, and lift[ed] a halt on [the] death penalty.”165 The law grants 
security forces broad and vague monitoring and surveillance powers, extends incommunicado 
detention from 6 to up to 15 days for terrorism suspects, and permits courts to close hearings 
to the public and allows witnesses to remain anonymous to the defendants.166  The law also 
expands terrorist offenses to acts “causing harm to private and public property, vital 
resources, infrastructures, means of transport and communication, IT systems or public 
services” when they are part of an individual or collective enterprise.167 The law also restricts 
freedom of expression—any person who is found to have “publicly and clearly praised” a 
terrorist crime, the perpetrator of a terrorist crime, an organization or an alliance connected 
with terrorist crimes, their members or their activities could be sentenced to up to five years 
in prison. 168  However, the law does not include any penalties on gross human rights 
violations committed by foreign fighters.   
The breadth of violent extremism-related criminal penalties created by this law is likely to 
have a noticeable impact on women.  As noted above, women continue to be in the minority 
of recruits for violent extremist organizations and often play marginal and supporting roles 
in any extremist activities. Thus, a law that expands the kinds of acts that qualify as criminal 
acts is likely to result in more women being prosecuted and imprisoned for potentially minor 
and low-level involvement in extremist organizations.  
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In addition, women will be impacted by the limitations on religious freedom resulting from 
government regulation of the mosques in Tunisia,169 as well as freedom to travel which is 
curtailed with the recent travel bans for young Tunisians.170  Again, limitations on these sorts 
of freedoms, while generally applicable, may have a disproportionate impact on women who 
already often experience disparate limits to their movement and religious choice as a result 
of gender discrimination.      
Moreover, in Tunisia, public support for human rights appears to have eroded as a result of 
violent extremism. In an effort to address this, Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) initiated a 
campaign in Tunisia entitled “No to Terrorism, Yes to Human Rights” to educate the public 
about the deterioration of human rights in Tunisia.171 The campaign primarily consisted of 
videos meant to explain the potential effects of security measures that disregard human 
rights against ordinary Tunisians. The videos featured four subjects: a filmmaker, a traveler, 
a woman hurt by crossfire and an individual who was wrongfully detained.172 While the 
preliminary results were positive, further extremist activities resulted in a backlash against 
the campaign and HRW. On television, HRW was referred to as “Zionist,” “US-backed,” and 
“traitors with a hidden agenda.”173 On social media, HRW was sometimes referred to as the 
“Terrorist Rights Watch.” 174  These sorts of public attitudes create an environment that 
facilitates deprivation of human rights which is particularly dangerous for populations, like 
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GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN PCVE 
PROGRAMMING  
As detailed above, violent extremism has a significant impact on gender equality and 
women’s enjoyment of their human rights. Similarly, PCVE programming can have a 
negative impact on women as well. Under CEDAW, states have a duty to review any 
programming, policies and laws, including those on PCVE, whether implemented directly or 
through collaborators and partners, to ensure discriminatory impact and other negative 
human rights consequences for women are addressed. Moreover, as detailed above, under 
Articles 3 and 4, state parties to CEDAW must take affirmative measures to address women’s 
inequality. 1  PCVE programming implemented by the government, civil society and 
communities provides an important opportunity to promote women’s actual equality through 
leadership, inclusion, participation, empowerment and education.      
PCVE efforts varied to some extent by context and needs of each country in Tunisia, United 
States and Kenya. That said, implementing organizations seem to have coalesced around a 
set of similar, non-security approaches. This Section surveys the main types of programs 
observed by researchers:  media campaigns, development programs, direct 
interventions, community dialogue programs, community policing, capacity 
building and returnee assistance. Each program attempts to address one or more drivers 
of violent extremism by providing psychosocial support, economic opportunity or 
professional skills development, by presenting counter narratives, providing 
moderate education, detecting extremism or improving community relations.  
Researchers reviewed these various programs with attention towards whether, by design or 
through impact, they detracted from women’s equality and/or limited women’s enjoyment of 
their human rights as well as whether they missed opportunities to promote the rights and 
equality of women.  Researchers’ observations were informed by concerns expressed by the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism in a February 2016 report to the Human Rights 
Council on the “[i]mpact of measures that target specific groups or individuals.”2 Where 
programs limited women’s rights and equality, they tended to do so in the following ways: by 
prompting a backlash against women, marginalizing women, inadequately 
ensuring women’s participation or leadership, instrumentalizing women’s 
participation or detrimentally relying on gender stereotyping.   
In this Section, researchers describe the considerations and possible risks associated with 
each type of program. The goal of this analysis is to support program developers and 
facilitators to “ensure that [their] efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism do not 
impact adversely on women’s rights,” as directed by the U.N. Secretary-General.3 Many 
considerations listed below can be addressed with planning, attention to gender equality and 
anticipated impact on women. Potential solutions and recommendations are addressed in the 




One overarching concern is worth noting at the outset—the impact PCVE efforts may be 
having on organizations promoting women’s rights and equality in environments vulnerable 
to extremism.  This issue has received full treatment in Duke University School of Law’s 
International Human Rights Clinic Report, Tightening the Purse Strings: What Counter 
Terrorism Financing Costs Gender Equality and Security. 4  As the report details, some 
organizations doing important human rights work may find donor funding has been diverted 
from women’s initiatives to PCVE efforts. Similarly, funding may be denied to women’s 
organizations due to restrictions created in an effort to combat extremism. 5  Along these 
lines, donors may place increasing administrative burdens on organizations that receive 
funding in high risk areas making it difficult for smaller grassroots organizations to maintain 
accurate and reliable financial accounts.6 These concerns all merit attention to ensure PCVE 
programming does not undermine women’s rights efforts and that women’s peace and 
security organizations are able to effectively assist in addressing violent extremism.7  
MEDIA CAMPAIGNS 
Media campaigns are a popular approach to raise awareness, present counter-narratives 
and distribute critical messaging about violent extremism. Campaigns are thought to be 
particularly effective in harnessing the power of youth engagement. For example, several 
Tunisia-based programs are either engaged in or planning to implement programs to assist 
youth in writing and performing rap and hip hop songs—a popular genre among Tunisian 
youth—critical of violent extremism.8 
Web videos are also being used to distribute messages to at-risk individuals. Such 
programming currently includes debates, lessons on religion and national history, and 
testimonials by family members of foreign fighters.9 Given that social media is used to recruit 
individuals to violent extremism, the expectation is that this kind of programming may reach 
these and other individuals, providing education, imparting a more tolerant and moderate 
view of religion, promoting good citizenship and presenting the social consequences of violent 
extremism.10 Web videos have also been developed specifically to convince viewers of the 
importance of enforcing human rights guarantees and maintaining healthy police oversight, 
even in the face of serious security concerns.11 
Some organizations have taken on the production of documentaries. These include Raise Our 
Voices, a documentary in which Kenyan women share their experiences of life without sons 
and husbands who left to fight alongside extremist groups, as well as the experience of their 
family members returning.12 Call Back Home, another Kenyan documentary, focuses on the 
recruitment of youth to violent extremist causes.13 It includes interviews with community 
leaders on promoting community cohesion and the prevention of violent extremism. These 
leaders highlight misconceptions and misinterpretations of religious teachings that are 
taught to youth by extremist recruiters.14 In Tunisia, one organization has produced a series 
of short films featuring the experiences of women, two of which were in post-production as of 




Finally, some organizations have turned to broadcast radio.16 In Kenya, African Women 
Advocating Peace and Security in Africa (“AWAPSA”) and Humanity, Activism, Knowledge, 
Integrity (“HAKI”) Africa have introduced radio programs where women share their 
experiences as “women left behind.” These radio programs are interactive, where listeners 
can call in live to voice concerns and queries. This platform may also serve as a kind of 
psychosocial support for affected women and may improve the community’s ability to detect 
extremism.    
Some organizations have begun to pursue strategies beyond traditional platforms to include 
social media and peer-to-peer communication, including WhatsApp, when targeting youth 
vulnerable to radicalization.17 AWAPSA and HAKI in Kenya have taken considerable steps 
in this regard. The Kenya Community Support Centre (“KECOSCE”),18 which operates in 
Kenya’s coastal regions, aims to empower communities to prevent and counter radicalization 
through youth capacity building, community organizations, and community dialogue.19 To 
reach wider communities, KECOSCE utilizes not only radio, but other multimedia such as 
billboards, LED screens, and social media.20 As part of its Countering Violent Extremism 
Through Multimedia and Forum Series initiative which targets youth aged 15 to 25 years in 
Mombasa, KECOSCE is not only conducting bi-weekly radio talk shows, which feature PCVE 
themed discussions, but also organizing forums which include screenings of Watutu film.21 
Watutu showcases life and experience of a coastal Kenyan Muslim youth who became 
radicalized and was recruited by Al-Shabab.22 The aim of such initiatives and forums is again 
to present counter-narratives and highlight dangers of participating in VE activities.  
Muslim groups in Kenya are engaging strategically to delegitimize Al-Shabaab’s use of Islam 
to spread terror. The Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism (“BRAVE”) initiative, 
the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (“SUPKEM”), and the Center for Ihsan and 
Educational Development (“CIED”) are examples of organizations that focus on “countering 
the use of Islam to legitimize violence” and have developed “programs to offset militant 
ideology.”23 They run media campaigns on social and electronic media that aim to counter 
extremist messages and teach Muslims about interfaith dialogue and the effects of terrorism. 
Being Kenyan Being Muslim (“BKBM”) is another campaign to present counter-narratives. 
The pilot BKBM initiative was a sixteen-contact-hour, multi-media course for individuals 
who are exposed to extremist discourse, and for training professionals aiming to counter 
extremism.24 An impact evaluation of BKBM concluded that the initiative’s pilot program 




 Considerations with Media Campaigns 
In Tunisia, in particular, there could be greater efforts to involve women on an equal basis 
in media campaigns. Involving women in media campaigns will avoid marginalizing 
gender, instead ensuring women will gain access on equal footing to a forum for speech and 
the opportunity to serve as educators and leaders. A lack of visibility of women in media is 
marginalizing, leaving unchallenged conceptions of women as unimportant in efforts to 
counter violent extremism. 26  Encouragingly, at least with respect to testimonial media 
campaigns, it appeared that women’s voices are better represented.27 It also does not appear 
sufficient efforts are made to reach female audiences—either with respect to the format or 
the content of the messaging. Failure to consider women as target listeners not only 
represents a missed opportunity to reach half of the population, but has the potential to 
further marginalize women, as they may not receive the benefits of effective programming 
on par with their male counterparts. 
Efforts to involve women must also keep in mind the potential for media campaigns that 
promote human rights and/or women’s human rights to prompt backlash against women.28 
The backlash against human rights defenders following the Human Rights Watch campaign 
in Tunisia may serve as a cautionary tale. Depending on the social and cultural climate in 
which a campaign takes place, an environment with an increasingly negative attitude 
towards human rights protections could pose risks unique to women, who are already 
vulnerable due to their gender. Media campaigns by necessity expose participants to a larger 
audience who will become aware of their or their family’s association with violent extremism 
or their efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. These considerations may be 
ameliorated with attention to context-appropriate messaging, advanced planning and 
anticipation of potential negative consequences.  
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
Researchers in Tunisia encountered one development program managed by the Union 
Nationale de la Femme Tunisienne (“UNFT”) and apparently funded in part by the Ministry 
of Women’s Affairs. UNFT provides vocational training, instruction for women and girls in 
animal husbandry and beekeeping, material assistance in the form of clothing and household 
goods, and opportunities for girls to participate in sporting events. While UNFT’s primary 
aim was to alleviate poverty, it also expects the support provided to help in preventing women 
and girls from getting involved with violent extremists.29 Particularly on the southern border 
of Tunisia, it is not uncommon for women to cook or otherwise share food with members of 
extremist groups in exchange for a modest sum of money.30 Providing this kind of economic 
support, then, is hoped to decrease the incentives for women to indirectly support violent 
extremism in the region.     
In Kenya, a development program called Kenya Tuna Uwezo31 (“KTU”)32 aimed to reduce 




premise that feelings of marginalization and alienation from the society in informal 
settlements can lead to conflict and violence, KTU created opportunities and “increase 
demand for cooperative action among conflicting groups.”34  After four years of program 
implementation, KTU had provided entrepreneurial and technical training to youth to assist 
them in starting small businesses and securing skilled employment35 and facilitated the 
creation of small business for some youth.36 In addition, KTU trained other civil society 
organizations in conflict-sensitive programming and violent extremism. It also engaged 
vulnerable at-risk groups to engage in constructive dialogue on community needs and 
challenges.37  
 Considerations for Development Programs  
Development programs, such as the one run by UNFT, should also account for potential 
backlash against women, particularly where only women receive benefits or where women 
primarily receive benefits. UNFT’s vocational training, for example, offers training in small 
animal care and beekeeping, work which is often seen as that of women and girls.38 However, 
as always, concerns about backlash are weighed against the advantages of addressing 
existing inequalities and the value they provide in promoting women’s equality.  
Strikingly, researchers were told in more than one interview in Tunisia of the existence of a 
generation of “chômeurs diplomés,”39 men who are reluctant to pursue menial employment 
that they believe to be below their education or skills level.40  This was said to be less the case 
with women who were more likely to accept any available employment. If true, it may make 
it less likely that men will react negatively to women receiving preferential or exclusive 
access to job training in these undesirable professions. However, this, in turn, raises the 
concerns that programs may marginalize women by relegating them to low paid or 
undesirable professions or rely on gender stereotypes, by limiting training to areas of work 
thought to be appropriate for women and girls.  
Thus, program developers should be wary of inadequately ensuring women’s 
participation in development programs, particularly where material assistance is 
distributed, and ensure such assistance is provided in a way that promotes women’s equal 
access to desirable employment while also anticipating and addressing potential backlash 
caused by cultural norms that may perceive work as determined by gender.   
DIRECT INTERVENTIONS  
Direct intervention programs focused on providing psychosocial support to individuals 
directly impacted by extremism. In Kenya, the Women’s Initiative for Female Empowerment 
(“WIFE”) brought together “women left behind” by family members fighting with violent 
extremist groups abroad, offering them psychological support and an avenue for 
reintegration in their communities. This program also sought to train women on how to 




detect extremism. African Women Advocating Peace and Security in Africa (“AWAPSA”) and 
the Coastal Education Center (“COEC”) run a similar program, Women Against Violence 
Extremism (“WAVE”) that provides trauma counseling to “women left behind” and to those 
targeted by law enforcement.  
UN Women Kenya also supports local partners to provide safe spaces for women to share 
their experiences and regain their confidence in a protected environment.41 Some safe spaces 
also serve as shelters for women who have been victims of extremism or other violence.42 
Support groups and safe spaces can be a great source of strength for affected women.43 In 
addition to providing psychosocial support, some programs also provide affected women with 
economic opportunities to assist in reintegrating them into their communities. In this sense, 
direct interventions may resemble development programs. For example, as part of WAVE, 
COEC has been connecting women with small savings and micro-finance loan services to 
“help them start up their own businesses, building their self-reliance and ability to provide 
for themselves and their families.”44  
Support groups also aim to improve the community’s ability to identify at-risk individuals. 
By sharing their experiences, women help each another identify “early-warning signs” 
exhibited by male family members. A USAID activity assessment conducted in 2015 reported 
that “women and girls . . . [have] an important role in resisting violent extremism, because 
they [are] in a better position to observe changing behaviors of their children or significant 
others.”45 Humanity Activism Knowledge Integrity (“HAKI”) Africa, going one step ahead, has 
also started to train women to identify at-risk youth.  As highlighted by a United States Peace 
Institute’s study, developing mothers’ skills to identify early warning signs of radicalization 
inculcates confidence and determination in them to move beyond the family sphere and 
engage the community through media and technology.46 However, some stakeholders in 
Kenya were skeptical about the effectiveness of such programs. 47  According to one 
stakeholder, children hide their activities from mothers, and hence, the assumption that 
mothers are a good point of access to at-risk children does not hold ground. 48 
Fionnuala (2015), on the other hand, states that such programs underestimate “the personal 
and social contexts in which these women live in ways that fail to appreciate the complexity 
of the roles they play in their families and communities.”49 
Mentoring programs offer another form of support and are common in Kenya. AWAPSA, 
HAKI, and MUHURI Africa run youth mentorship programs. Royal United Services Institute 
(“RUSI”) pairs former criminals with youth mentees, which allows the mentors to provide a 
counter narrative about participation in crime. HAKI engages young individuals from 14 to 
30 years of age, who are school dropouts or not working, through activities such as sports, 
debates, exhibitions and theatre to focus their energies on productive activities and prevent 
them from being radicalized. HAKI also runs a program specifically geared towards engaging 
at-risk women and counseling them against joining extremist groups. Young school girls and 




also lobbies directly on behalf of female Muslim students persecuted for wearing religious 
headgear, hijab.50   
Other programs facilitate increased participation of women in planning PCVE programs and 
policies. For example, the COEC’s Mini Bus community dialogue program used a mini bus to 
pick up women and others from the community to ensure they attended the organization’s 
meetings to develop a charter on women against VE.51 The mini bus picked up women 
heading to work in the morning, and then dropped them to their respective places of work.52 
It acted as a platform to bring women and other community members together to raise 
awareness on women’s roles in PCVE and give recommendations on the proposed charter. 53 
Still other direct interventions focus on providing social activities for youth who are thought 
to be particularly at-risk of adopting violently extreme ideology. As a part of its efforts to 
address violent extremism in Kenya, RUSI provides activities for youth in low-income Somali 
neighborhoods. The Union des Tunisiens Indépendants pour la Liberté (“UTIL”) expressed 
interest in developing youth programming in the approximately 650 currently defunct youth 
centers around Tunisia, as a way of providing access to sports, music, and film.54 In this 
scheme, “monitors” at the centers—expected to be primarily women—would be trained to 
identify at-risk youth. 
In its most extreme form, direct intervention involves engaging those who are currently or 
were very recently involved with violent extremism. UTIL had, on at least one occasion, taken 
family members—and mothers in particular—to visit their sons in a Syrian prison. The 
administration of UTIL believed that mothers’ close relationship with children makes their 
engagement particularly useful in preventing young people from becoming involved or 
continuing to associate with violent extremists.55 The expectation is that seeing their mothers 
would inspire young detainees to turn forever from violent extremism.56  
 Considerations with Direct Interventions 
Direct intervention programs run the risk of instrumentalizing women. A program like 
WIFE that provides women counseling, but also expects them to play an active role in 
dialogue with at-risk communities, may compel women to participate more actively in efforts 
to address violent extremism than they might otherwise choose. This kind of quid pro quo 
arrangement in which a service is provided in exchange for participation runs the risk of 
pressuring women to engage in programs. This, in turn, may result in less successful 
outcomes, where women are only participating in order to receive a service. There are several 
ways to avoid these dynamics, such as providing the service independent of agreements to 
participate or moderating the requirements so that women may choose to participate in the 
PCVE program to varying degrees.  
In addition, interventions that engage women solely because of their status as mothers, such 
as UTIL’s arranging for mothers to visit their sons in prison, rely on gender stereotypes 




as caretakers. They may also color women’s own conceptions of the limited relevance of their 
participation to efforts to address and prevent violent extremism. As programs that involve 
parents may be quite helpful in efforts to combat extremism, there are various 
implementation considerations that could minimize the negative impact on women caused 
by focusing solely on their identity as mothers. Programs could involve women and men 
equally as fathers and mothers. Programs that focus on mothers could have added elements 
that empower women as women and/or engage women as mothers but also in their other 
social, economic and cultural capacities.       
Many of the direct intervention programs encountered could better ensure women’s 
participation. For example, it was unclear whether women and girls had access to 
mentoring programs on an equal basis with men and boys, although at least one program 
was geared specifically towards young women.57 The same can be said of efforts to provide 
youth with social and cultural opportunities. While at least one organization arranges 
sporting events for girls in rural areas, it is unclear whether other programs—established or 
nascent—make efforts to include girls and women in these sorts of cultural opportunities. 58 
In these circumstances, young women and girls may have a difficult time otherwise 
participating without affirmative efforts to include them.      
COMMUNITY DIALOGUE 
Many community dialogue programs encountered by researchers have a religious component 
and seek to reduce tensions between those of different faiths. In Kenya, AWAPSA’s “Friends 
Without Borders” program brings Christian and Muslim women from Madrassah together to 
discuss their differences and to present counter narratives.59 Women are the focus of this 
program, as they are increasingly seen as a stabilizing force in the community.60 RUSI 
conducts a similar program, working with whole communities to hold discussions about 
spiritual and ethnic differences, suspected to fuel some types of violent extremism. In 
Tunisia, the Ministry of Human Rights, with support from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), hosted a three day-long conference to bring imams and popular youth 
bloggers together from five nations to create dialogue around presenting violent extremism 
through social networks, as part of the Ministry’s “plateforme de contrediscourse.”61 Other 
community dialogue programs aim to bring community members together with law 
enforcement. These efforts will be discussed in the next Section on community policing. 
 Considerations with Community Dialogue 
While women appear to be involved in various community dialogue programs, one potential 
consideration is ensuring women’s participation in dialogue programs across genders.  It 
appears that some dialogue programs may involve women dialoguing with each other but it 
is also important to provide a forum in which women’s voices can be prominent in the 
community at large. Similarly, it is important to ensure, where appropriate, that women 




communicate their positions and perspectives outside of the program so that such 
conversations are not limited to the program space. 
COMMUNITY POLICING 
In Tunisia and Kenya, some interviewees expressed skepticism about the feasibility of 
community policing programs, citing the difficult relationship between state security and 
marginalized communities, the latter having repeatedly been the target of due process and 
other human rights violations. In Tunisia, stakeholders noted that it was likely to take time 
to develop relationships between community and police due to frequent abuses by police and 
the resulting very low levels of confidence of marginalized communities in the police.62 
Despite this, others expressed some optimism about community policing as a goal, at least in 
theory, particularly if effectuated through security forces that have favorable relationships 
with the surrounding communities.63 Yet others believed effective community policing may 
even serve to reduce violent extremism, to the extent that some extremism is catalyzed by 
abusive security measures.64 
In Tunisia, for several years, UNDP supported community policing workshops for local 
security forces and the rehabilitation of some buildings in a dozen community policing 
stations.65 The Ministry of the Interior may replicate these stations in the future.66 In Kenya, 
community policing programs, geared towards detecting violent extremism, are already 
underway. AWAPSA facilitates roundtable discussions between women in the community 
and law enforcement, to build trust between the two groups and to encourage women to share 
information about extremism in their own communities. The Kenyan Ministry of the 
Interior’s community policing efforts—in its most recent iteration, known as Nyumba Kumi—
sought to bring together small groups of community members to share their concerns with 
police. However, these efforts, according to one reporter, “have yielded little fruit.”67 This is 
due in large part to the acute lack of trust between targeted communities and security forces 
in the country.  
KECOSCE is also implementing Countering Violent Extremism through building stronger, 
more resilient local communities in the coast of Kenya in Mombasa, Kwale and Lamu counties. 
68  The program aims to improve relations between law enforcement and youth through 
engagement and empowerment activities such as youth discussion forums where police 
officials are also participants. 
 Considerations with Community Policing Programs 
Because police forces in Tunisia and Kenya are overwhelmingly staffed by men, community 
policing programs tend to have quite defined gender dynamics.  The police that participate 
are mostly male while community members may be male or female.  These dynamics should 
be taken into account in constructing the framework for the dialogue in ensuring women’s 




female officers engaging with a community. This has its own issues in that often women 
police officers have little influence in the department at large and thus any policies or 
approaches they may have learned in the engagements may not be effectively communicated 
or mainstreamed within the department. Such programs could include components that 
empower female officers within the departments.   
CAPACITY BUILDING 
Local civil society organizations, with support from USAID and UNDP in Kenya, are 
implementing programs to build community and individual capacity in an effort to reduce 
vulnerability to violent extremism. USAID’s “Strengthening Community Resilience against 
Extremism” program supports civil-society organizations “working on conflict and countering 
violent extremism (CVE) in the six counties on the Kenyan coastal region.”69 Coast Education 
Center (“COEC”) is one of eight local organizations receiving USAID assistance to strengthen 
its advocacy and operations to address violent extremism. 70  USAID’s Kenya Transition 
Initiative–Eastleigh (“KTI-E”) provides support to organizations in the predominantly Somali 
neighborhood in Nairobi for programs that build capacity among youth and community for 
moderation and non-violence, empower the local youth,  and provide livelihood support for 
youth. 71  Act Change Transform (“ACT!”) is a grant management agency that supports 
partner organizations working in “peacebuilding and conflict transformation.”72 ACT! also 
offers grantees “technical assistance” and “organizational development” services. The 
objective of these kinds of grants is to build the capacity of local actors to effectively address 
violent extremism in their communities. 
Muslim organizations are also engaged in training of religious leaders and clerics to counter 
radicalization efforts. In this regard, BRAVE has developed a training manual, which 
includes an “Early Warning Against Radicalization and Violent Extremism” tool that 
attempts to identify “early warning signs of radicalization and violent extremism.” 73 
Similarly, the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (“CIPK”), through its vast network 
of Muslim clerics and regular training of its members, aims to “protect their mosques from 
being used by extremist preachers and to include the youth in their mosque committees.”74 
Local organizations are also involved in capacity building of law enforcement on PCVE, 
Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa (“STRIVE”) program 
being implemented by RUSI involves capacity building and training of mid-level and senior 
law enforcement managers working in high risk areas on PCVE.75 
Locally supported programs are also engaged in capacity building efforts. One organization 
in Tunisia has developed programming aimed at educating female police officers about their 
rights and responsibilities under Resolution 1325 and encouraging them to seek promotions 
within their departments.76 The same organization’s “Peace Ambassador” program selects 
women in equal proportion to men for training and assistance in developing region-specific 




 Considerations with Capacity Building Programs  
Community capacity building programs appear to receive significant external donor funding. 
One possible area of concern is that external donors tend to fund more well-established 
organizations for administrative and technical convenience.  Researchers noted that, at least 
in Tunisia, some of the smaller less established organizations were directed by women. 78 As 
such, it is possible that capacity building programs may fail to adequately ensure women’s 
participation and leadership where external donors are not willing to support less 
established female-lead organizations.  
As with many programs, capacity building programs directed at women, such as female police 
officers for example, can prompt backlash. Again, these concerns may be ameliorated by 
providing at the outset groundwork to anticipate potential backlash, laying out the benefits 
of capacity building to non-targets, building capacity of targets to respond to potential 
backlash and providing resources in a thoughtful manner.    
RETURNEE ASSISTANCE 
Returnee assistance programs were limited in both Tunisia and Kenya. For example, 
returnees were not accepted in a domestic violence shelter visited by researchers in Tunisia.79 
Researchers in Kenya came across few programs that offered services to returnees. 
Stakeholders there described government backlash against the returnees and local 
organizations that assisted them.80 Some returnees have had their financial accounts frozen 
and released only after court intervention. 81 Identifying returnees is a challenge in Kenya as 
well. Returnees do not readily identify themselves due to fear of abduction and extra-judicial 
killings perpetrated, according to one stakeholder, either by the state or by violent extremist 
groups.82 Only one of the interviewed stakeholders worked with returnee women and had 
differentiated between programs for “women left behind” and those for returnees.83 
Researchers are concerned that the lack of returnee services risked marginalizing women 
with connections to violent extremism. Without adequate support, already vulnerable women 
may be driven to further desperation. This may be particularly true in prison, where women 
may be held upon return.84 As noted above, it is unclear where female returnees are held and 
what conditions they are subjected to in detention. However, the same concerns likely exist 
as with the male returnee population of further radicalization in detention and reintegration 
as well as concerns specific to women in the areas of reproduction and child care.  
 
1 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13, available at 






2 Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, ¶ 20, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/65 (Feb. 22, 2016). 
3 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism ¶ 53, Office of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/70/674 
(Dec 24, 2015), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674 [accessed 5 
August 2017].  
4 International Human Rights Clinic Duke University School of Law, Tightening the Purse Strings, 
Duke Law, March 2017, 39, available at 
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/humanrights/tighteningpursestrings.pdf [accessed 7 August 
2017]. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 69. 
7 Id. at 39. 
8 Interview with UTIL (Union des Tunisiens Indépendants pour la Liberté), in Tunis, Tunisia (March 14, 
2017) (interview notes on file with authors). At least one example appears to be available at 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/UTILTn/videos/?ref=page_internal [accessed 6 May 2017].   
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Interview with Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights Watch, in Tunis, Tunisia 
(March 16, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors) (discussing HRW’s “Say No to Terrorism, Yes to 
Human Rights” campaign). 
12 Interview with AWAPSA – AFRICA, in Mombasa, Kenya (March 18 2017) (interview notes on file 
with authors). 
13 Interview with Coastal Education Center, Mombasa, Kenya (March 18, 2017) (interview notes on file 
with authors). 
14 Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE), USAID, Kenya and East Africa, 
available at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/SCORE%20Draft 
%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [accessed 7 August 2017]. 
15 Interview with IIHD, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 16, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors). 
Organizational social media page available at https://www.facebook.com/org.IDH/ [accessed 7 August 
2017]. 
16 Interview with HAKI (Humanity, Activism, Knowledge Integrity) Africa, in Mombasa, Kenya (March 
17, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors); Interview with AWAPSA – AFRICA, in Mombasa, 
Kenya (March 18 2017) (interview notes on file with authors).  
17 Strengthening regional capacities to prevent and counter violent extremism in the Greater Horn of 
Africa. Djibouti: IGAD (2016) available at http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/17-
19Feb_HoA-CVE-Stakeholders- Meeting-Outcome-Document_FINAL.pdf [accessed 7 August 2017] 
18 William Robert Avis, The role of online/social media in countering violent extremism in East Africa, 







19 N. Hassan, The role of CSOs in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) - A case of actors in East African 
Region, UMYDF Working Paper Series 1: 2014. Kampala: Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum, 
available at http://umydf.org/downloads/Role%20of%20CSOs.pdf [accessed 7 August 2017]. 
20 Id. 
21 Countering Violent Extremism through multimedia and forum series in Mombasa, Kenya, Kenya 
Community Support Center, available at http://www.kecosce.org/index.php/programme-and-
projects/current-projects/154-promoting-youth-resilience-to-radicalism-and-violent-extremism [accessed 
7 August 2017] 
22 Id. 
23 Anthony Langat, Muslim leaders are trying to change the way Kenya fights terrorism, PRI.org, 23 
August 2015, available at https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-08-23/muslim-leaders-are-trying-change-way-
kenya-fights-terrorism [accessed 7 August 2017]. 
24 Savage et al. Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya through Value Complexity: Assessment of Being 
Kenyan Being Muslim, JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC SECURITY, 2014, 7(3), pp: 1-26. 
25 Id. 
26 For instance, a failure to reach out to young women and involve young women in a program for young 
rappers might leave the notion that young women don’t rap unchallenged. Of course, this is not the case. 
See Nicki Minaj, Lil’ Kim, Lauryn Hill, Missy Elliott, Azealia Banks, Remy Ma, and M.I.A. in the United 
States as current examples. See also the self-published YouTube music video, “Hijabi” by Mona Haydar, 
which went viral only a day or two prior to this writing, available at https://youtu.be/XOX9O_kVPeo 
[accessed 8 August 2017]. Afghani rapper Paradise Sorouri raps against extremism and violence against 
women from Germany available at https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/dec/01/afghanistan-first-
female-rapper-paradise-sorouri-143band-interview [accessed 7 August 2017]. 
27 Interview with Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights Watch, in Tunis, Tunisia 
(March 16, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors) (discussing the “Say No Terrorism, Yes to 
Human Rights” campaign, in which one woman and three men participated); Interview with IIHD, in 
Tunis, Tunisia (March 16, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors) (discussing IIHD’s short film 
series, in which a majority of women are expected to participate). 
28 Interview with IIHD, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 16, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors); 
Interview with Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights Watch, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 
16, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors). 
29 Interview with Union National de la Femme Tunisienne, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 14, 2017) 
(interview notes on file with authors). 
30 Id. 
31 Kiswahili for “We have the power!” 
32 Democracy, Governance and Conflict, USAID.gov, available at 
https://www.usaid.gov/kenya/democracy-human-rights-and-governance [accessed 8 August 2017]. 
33 Kenya Tuna Uwezo Program: A KAP Survey Report, CHF International, Conducted by Africa Peace 








35 Democracy, Governance and Conflict, USAID.gov, available at 
https://www.usaid.gov/kenya/democracy-human-rights-and-governance [accessed 7 August 2017]. 
36 Id. 
37 Kenya Tuna Uwezo “We have the power”, USAID, available at 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Kenya%20Tuna%20Uwezo.pdf [accessed 7 
August 2017]. 
38 Interview with UNICEF, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 17, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors). 
39 “Unemployed graduates.” 
40 Interview with UNDP, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 15, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors).  
41 Interview with UN Women, in Nairobi, Kenya (March 16, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors).  
42 Interview with Coastal Education Center, in Mombasa, Kenya (March 18, 2017) (interview notes on 
file with authors). 
43 Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE), supra note 14. 
44 Interview with Coastal Education Center, in Mombasa, Kenya (March 18, 2017) (interview notes on 
file with authors). 
45 Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE), supra note 14. 
46 United States Peace Institute (USIP) (2015) Charting a New Course: Thought for Action Kit: Women 
Preventing Violent Extremism, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, available at 
http://www.women-without-borders.org/files/downloads/Women-Preventing-Violent-Extremism-
Charting-New-Course.pdf [accessed 8 August 2017].  
47Interview with RUSI, in Nairobi, Kenya (March 15, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors). 
48 Id. 
49 Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala (2015) ‘Jihad, counter-terrorism and mothers’, Just Security, March 4, available 
at https://www.justsecurity.org/20407/jihad-counter-terrorism-mothers/ [accessed 13 December 2016]. 
50 Interview with AWAPSA – AFRICA, in Mombasa, Kenya (March 18 2017) (interview notes on file 
with authors). 
51 Interview with Coastal Education Center, in Mombasa, Kenya (March 18, 2017) (interview notes on 
file with authors). 
52 Interview with Coastal Education Center, in Mombasa, Kenya (March 18, 2017) (interview notes on 
file with authors). 
53 Id. 
54 In Tunisia in particular, engaging youth in cultural pursuits as a way of cultivating a healthy self-
identity was believe to be a particularly effective method of combatting violent extremism. See also 
interview with UTIL, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 14, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors) (detailing 
UTIL’s efforts to engage youth in producing music critical of violent extremism).  
55 Interview with UTIL (Union des Tunisiens Indépendants pour la Liberté), in Tunis, Tunisia (March 
14, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors). But see interview with UNICEF, in Tunis, Tunisia 
(March 17, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors) (citing a study that suggested fathers were 






56 The UTIL director also arranged to have the press present, outside of the prison. Interview with 
UTIL, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 14, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors).    
57 Interview with HAKI Africa, in Mombasa, Kenya (March 17, 2017) (interview notes on file with 
authors). 
58 Interview with RUSI, in Nairobi, Kenya (March 15, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors); 
Interview with UTIL, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 14, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors). 
59 Interview with AWAPSA – AFRICA, in Mombasa, Kenya (March 18 2017) (interview notes on file 
with authors). 
60 Id. 
61 Interview with UNDP, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 15, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors).    
62 Interview with Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights Watch, in Tunis, Tunisia 
(March 16, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors).   
63 Interview with UNODC, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 16, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors). 
64 Id.   
65 Interview with UNDP, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 15, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors). 
66 Id. 
67 Fred Mukinda, Nyumba Kumi has little to show as crime rate continues to soar (Daily Nation, Apr 13, 
2016), available at http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Nyumba-Kumi-has-little-to-show-/1056-3158236-
vn8wy5/index.html [accessed 5 August 2017]. 
68 Countering Violent Extremism through building stronger, more resilient local communities in the 
coast of Kenya, Kenya Community Support Centre, available at 
http://www.kecosce.org/index.php/programme-and-projects/current-projects/203-countering-violent-
extremism-through-building-stronger-more-resilient-local-communities-in-the-coast-of-kenya [accessed 7 
August 2017]. 
69 Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE), USAID, Kenya and East Africa, 
supra note 14. 
70 Id. 
71 Midterm Evaluation of Three Countering Violent Extremism Projects, USAID, 22 February 2013, 
available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacx479.pdf [accessed 7 August 2017]. 
72 See ACT webpage, available at http://www.act.or.ke/ [accessed 5 August 2017]. 
73 Finn et al., Youth Evaluations of CVE/PVE Programming in Kenya in Context, 2016, available at 
http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/viewFile/62/52 [accessed 7 August 2017]. 
74 Langat, supra note 23. 
75 Strengthening Resilience against Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa (STRIVE), RUSI.org, 
available at https://rusi.org/projects/strive-horn-africa [accessed 7 August 2017]. 
76 Interview with IIHD, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 16, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors) 
(discussing IIHD’s 1325 Training program). 







79 Interview with AFTD (Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates), in Tunis, Tunisia (March 14, 
2017) (interview notes on file with authors); Interview with Le Centre Tamkin, outside of Tunis, Tunisia 





84 Interview with AFTD, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 14, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors); 
Interview with UTIL, in Tunis, Tunisia (March 14, 2017) (interview notes on file with authors) 




RECOMMENDATIONS   
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  ENSURE A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH IN DESIGN, 
IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW OF PCVE EFFORTS THAT 
SEPARATES PREVENTION FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT 
By ratifying CEDAW, 189 state parties, including Tunisia and Kenya, have committed to 
ensuring laws, policies and programs do not discriminate against women and that they 
respect their basic rights. States have also committed to advancing women’s equality through 
affirmative measures. PCVE programming is no exception.  
A PCVE program that separates prevention programming from security oriented 
programming is more likely to be human rights oriented.  When programs combine law 
enforcement with prevention goals, initiatives are less effective and undermine community 
participation and relationships. If communities are only engaged within a security 
framework, they are less likely to see themselves as partners, and more as targets of the 
state. In both Kenya and Tunisia, stakeholders reported government action that potentially 
violates women’s human rights through police harassment and raids, arbitrary detention, 
disappearances and even extra judicial killings, among others. While some organizations in 
Tunisia viewed the government as more human rights compliant in its approach, Kenyan 
organizations uniformly expressed concern in this area. As reported, women detained in 
Kenya for suspected terror attacks are not allowed to meet friends, family members or legal 
representatives, are not given medical care, and only released upon payment of extremely 
high monetary bonds.1  
All counterterrorism and PCVE efforts should be reviewed for adverse human rights impacts, 
including a detrimental impact on women’s equality. To ensure such programs are gender-
sensitive and gender-effective, programs should be designed and implemented in a manner 
that protects women’s human rights and equality. Programs that fail to take a human rights 
approach run the risk of advancing discrimination, instrumentalizing the rights of women, 
marginalizing their input and participation and even promoting backlash against women.     
Further, PCVE programs are opportunities to advance women’s equality through affirmative 
measures. PCVE programming, when designed with women’s equality in mind, can provide 
opportunities for women’s leadership and community engagement, capacity building, 
economic and professional equality and access to education and skills training.  These 
opportunities should be considered and seized by the government and its partners in the 




2. PRIORITIZE GENDER-SENSITIVE AND GENDER-EFFECTIVE 
STRATEGIES AND REFORMS IN THE SECURITY SECTOR  
The security sector should review its strategies, plan and operations, including recruitment, 
hiring, training, working practices and community engagement methods, for gender-related 
considerations and human rights oriented reforms more generally. This would not only 
ensure compliance with obligations under CEDAW but improve the operational effectiveness 
of security sector PCVE efforts by ensuring they are responsive to the entire community 
serviced and that they are engaging women as both partners and participants.     
This review should have goals of developing a gender-inclusive security sector at all levels as 
well as security practices that are gender-sensitive and gender-effective. A gender-inclusive 
security sector should include increased recruitment and hiring of women at all levels as well 
as development of an environment and practices that are inclusive, responsive to the 
challenges women face in the security sector and promoting of women’s advancement and 
leadership. Both Tunisia and Kenya suffer from significant underrepresentation of women 
in law enforcement. 
Gender-sensitive and gender-effective security practices include consideration and 
assessment of women and gender equality in all aspects of security sector activities including 
policing and detention. In the context of policing, considerations could include how police may 
more effectively engage with female community members and build trust through 
responsiveness, for example, to domestic violence situations. Considerations could also 
include ensuring female detainees are detained in conditions that account for women’s 
reproductive, maternal and psychological needs. Practices should be reviewed in light of 
women’s social, economic, legal and cultural roles to determine how women’s needs may be 
better served, how women may be better engaged as community partners and how women’s 
recruitment may be more effectively addressed.  
3. SUPPORT BUILDING RESILIENT COMMUNITIES THAT ARE 
INCLUSIVE, PROMOTE EQUALITY AND ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE 
BETWEEN WOMEN AND GIRLS, MEN AND BOYS  
 
Violent extremism inevitably impacts the economic, social, cultural and political well-being 
of an entire community. Program elements should encourage strong communities that 
protect community values and encourage recognition of women and girls as critical and equal 
voices to men and boys. This kind of programming can lay the groundwork for other more 
targeted prevention interventions and ensure communities can be equal partners in PCVE 
efforts in the long-term.  
Effective gender-sensitive and gender-effective approaches to PCVE require active 
engagement of the entire community, including boys and men.2 In otherwise male-dominated 




women’s presence is important to effectively creating space for women and girls and 
developing sustainable inclusive and diverse environments. 3  Media and other public 
education resources may be employed to promote male engagement with gender-sensitive 
PCVE efforts by advancing, for example, non-discriminatory behavior or introducing non-
violent conflict resolution methods. In Kenya, husbands and other male family members 
appear to have significant influence on women’s participation in programs because of 
traditional and religious practices.4 Under these circumstances, educating men on the value 
of increased women’s participation in PCVE will likely increase women’s presence in such 
programs. Similarly, religious leaders may be influential in ensuring non-discrimination and 
gender equality. For example, by implementing the Beirut Declaration and its 18 
commitments on “Faith for Rights,” which specifically includes the pledge to revisit those 
religious understandings and interpretations that appear to perpetuate gender inequality 
and harmful stereotypes or even condone gender-based violence, women’s engagement in 
PCVE efforts could be encouraged.5 
4. AVOID COUNTERPRODUCTIVE RELIANCE ON HARMFUL 
STEREOTYPES AND TRADITIONAL GENDER ROLES   
As noted, some PCVE programs rely on harmful stereotypes, such as equating women with 
motherhood or conceiving of them solely as victims, which may result in promotion of 
counterproductive and limiting traditional conceptions of women’s proper roles and identity.  
This does not mean PCVE efforts may not engage with the social and cultural roles women 
tend to play in many communities and families but it does mean such engagement should be 
thoughtful and reflective, considerate of the costs and consequences to women’s equality, and, 
where possible, inclusive of program components that seek to challenge or question 
counterproductive stereotypes and traditional roles. 
Stereotyping not only harms women but can undermine the success of PCVE programming. 
For example, many programs make assumptions that mothers and wives have defined roles 
in the family that may not reflect the reality of many families. Current studies measuring 
the effectiveness of such programs often rely on self-evaluations by mothers, which reinforce 
the idea that women have a special role within the family and have access to special 
information. 6  However, these self-evaluations do not objectively indicate the efficacy of 
utilizing women in PCVE programs. In fact, reports indicate that often children go to 
extensive lengths to hide their participation from their mothers in particular.7 
Moreover, women’s participation in preventing and identifying extremism in their 
communities may be underutilized by assumptions of their roles. Women’s predisposition to 
peace and/or tolerance, an example of another gender stereotype, may cause programs to be 
badly targeted or less effective. These stereotypes about women create a barrier to 
understanding women as affected by and as participants in violent extremism. Some policy 
makers might assume that women do not utilize violence as a manner of expressing agency, 




of violent extremism that currently impact women, and categorizes women solely as victims, 
or as apolitical actors, which ultimately hampers ongoing PCVE efforts.8 Ultimately, one-
dimensional depictions of women reinforce gendered stereotypes, and oversimplify analyses 
of and responses to the full range of reasons women participate in violent extremism and can 
participate in its prevention.9 
5. ENGAGE WOMEN AS CHANGE AGENTS AND CREATIVE LEADERS IN 
ALL FORMS OF PROGRAMMING 
Uniformly, women are being underutilized in efforts to prevent and counter violent 
extremism. With the exception of programs implemented at women-led civil society 
organizations, women are at most general participants or conduits for actual program 
targets. As half of the population, women have significant potential to serve as change agents 
in transforming factors that facilitate violent extremism. Maximizing this potential would 
require gender-aware program development and for women to be equally involved in all levels 
of programming from design to implementation to assessment of success. Towards this end, 
UN Security Council Resolution (“UNSCR”) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security stresses the 
importance of the equal participation and full involvement of women in this area and urges 
states to increase women’s representation at all levels of the decision-making process for the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflict.10  
To fully engage women as change agents, it is imperative that women play leadership roles 
in program design and conceptualization. Doing so ensures programming benefits from 
women’s experience, knowledge and perspective about cultural, political and social dynamics 
and conditions in their societies, communities and families. Programs that engage women 
only at the implementation stage are more likely to rely on misguided or counterproductive 
stereotypes and limited and narrow conceptualizations about women’s capabilities or 
relationships. Moreover, involving women and gender issues in program design ensures 
barriers and disincentives for women’s participation and leadership due to discrimination 
and inequality are anticipated at the outset.    
6. EMPHASIZE CAPACITY BUILDING AND EDUCATIONAL ELEMENTS 
OF PROGRAMS  
For women to be effective participants and leaders in PCVE efforts, capacity-building and 
education elements of programs should be emphasized. Where women are engaged in their 
role as parents, for example, they cannot simply be expected to recognize early warning signs 
of extremism without substantial education, training and program components that explore 
effective communication with children, among other things. As interviewed program 
directors themselves pointed out, it is difficult to identify “at-risk” individuals.11 Even if 
parents recognize extremist tendencies or sympathies in their children, they often lack the 




supported in their efforts to prevent their children from joining extremist groups, and also to 
build their own capacity to reject the influence of extremism and violence. Moreover, 
programs that target mothers should consider engaging fathers as well. Not only will such 
an engagement maximize parental intervention but also the support and involvement of the 
father will likely facilitate efficacy of the mother’s actions.      
Where possible and appropriate, programs focusing on women’s participation could consider 
adding empowerment and education around religion. Interviewed stakeholders in Kenya 
identified religious beliefs and religiously influenced socio-cultural norms as sometimes 
socializing women from an early age to be subservient and heavily influenced by male family 
members. Kenyan women, for example, felt obligated to “follow” their husbands to Somalia.12 
Programs could engage religious leaders to introduce or share interpretations of Islam that 
conceive of males and females in the context of equality.    
7. AVOID INSTRUMENTALIZING AND MARGINALIZING WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS WHICH CAN UNDERMINE ENGAGEMENT AND SERVE AS A 
LOST OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE WOMEN’S EQUALITY 
PCVE programs that incorporate women’s rights and interests are also more likely to succeed 
in engaging women and women’s organizations. Where PCVE programming engages women 
solely in order to utilize them as a means of collecting information, for example, they are less 
likely to successfully develop partnerships with women’s organizations if these organizations 
perceive women’s rights as subsidiary to security concerns. 13  Leaders of women’s 
organizations have also been reluctant to participate in counterterrorism programs because 
such policy circles have little overlap with women’s groups and hold as the primary goal 
security defined in military terms.14 Moreover, women’s organizations may perceive a cost to 
participating in such programs. In cases such as the United Kingdom’s Prevent program, 
participation in the program by women’s organizations fostered suspicion in the constituent 
communities and decreased the trust between women’s groups and the communities in which 
they worked.15 
8. EMPHASIZE TRANSPARENCY AND ONGOING EVALUATIONS OF 
UNINTENDED DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF PCVE PROGRAMMING  
As seen in the United States (see Appendix), there is often ambiguity and a lack of 
transparency around program funding. Greater transparency regarding funding sources, 
recipients of funding, evaluations of use of funds and whether the programs were deemed 
effective should be included in ongoing program evaluations. The efficacy of PCVE efforts is 
enhanced when women and girls are included in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. 
Gender-disaggregated data can provide a nuanced picture of the outputs and differential 




therefore be incorporated in the assessment of both general PCVE initiatives and those that 
specifically seek to advance women and girls’ roles in PCVE.  
9. ADDRESS LAWS AND POLICIES THAT LIMIT AND COMPROMISE 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS  
Even programs that promote women’s rights and maximize women’s leadership will face 
challenges in legal and political environments that limit women’s autonomy and/or fail to 
promote equality. PCVE efforts should support the passage and implementation of laws and 
policies that promote women’s equality, allowing women to act as change agents.    
10.  CONSIDER NEW APPROACHES FOR RETURNEES, REHABILITATION 
AND REINTEGRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PROSECUTION AND 
DETENTION 
As noted, research revealed a dearth of services and programs for women returnees. In fact, 
in Tunisia, services directed towards women subjected to violence did not consider female 
returnees as part of their client base.  Programming should be developed to address the 
complex issues around female returnees. As more and more women are successfully recruited 
and subsequently return to their communities, there is an important opportunity to engage 
with difficult questions and conduct an analysis of community and social conditions that may 
have encouraged women to join extremist organizations and may now make it difficult or 
impossible for them to rejoin their peers. Special attention should be paid to female returnees 
who are detained, as it is unclear where female returnees are held and what conditions they 
are subjected to in detention.  
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS BY PROGRAM TYPE 
1. MEDIA CAMPAIGNS  
Coordinators should undertake an evaluation of their own social and cultural climate, 
including potential risks for participants, at the outset of media programming. Coordinators 
should actively solicit the participation of women so that the same opportunities are available 
to men and women. Programmers should make it clear to the communities in which they 
operate that all individuals, including women, have important ideas and perspectives to bring 
to the table and diverse roles to play in the battle against violent extremism. Careful 
attention to messaging and plans that anticipate potential backlash are advisable.  
Coordinators should follow an informed consent model for participation in media campaigns 
or any other activity that poses special risks to participants. All participants should be 
warned of foreseeable potential risks posed by participation, especially risks unique to their 
demographic. Participants should only consent to participate after they have considered 




Coordinators should also consider addressing media campaigns to parents and family 
members when attempting to intervene with at-risk youth. As one interviewee in Tunisia 
noted, anti-drug campaigns in the United States that attempted to address young drug users 
may have been more effective when those efforts were addressed to their parents. 
2. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
Coordinators should undertake an evaluation of the local conditions, including potential 
barriers to women’s access, before implementing a development program. Program 
facilitators should take gender-specific barriers to access into account when delivering goods 
or services, and consider whether special accommodations could lead to better distribution. 
For example, facilitators may find that changing the time of day or the location of distribution 
may increase women’s participation. 
Program facilitators should review program implementation for indications that women are 
either (a) not benefitting on an equal basis with men or (b) suffering backlash from 
community members as a result of receiving development benefits. This might include 
periodic surveys of local program participants, or data collection to allow program facilitators 
to evaluate whether women are participating in the desired proportions, and if so, under 
what conditions. 
3. DIRECT INTERVENTIONS 
Developers should avoid exchanging goods or services for women’s participation in direct 
intervention programs. This sort of quid pro quo arrangement may exert coercive pressure 
on women to participate to a greater degree than they might otherwise choose.  
Coordinators should generally ensure all programs are available on an equal basis to women 
and girls. This is particularly true where women and girls may not be expected or welcome 
to participate in the same numbers as men and boys. For example, if the local atmosphere is 
such that women and girls may not feel welcome to participate in a youth sports program, 
special efforts should be made to ensure their participation and to make them feel welcome. 
Developers should take special care that direct intervention programs do not expose 
vulnerable populations to violent extremist ideology, and in so doing risk the perpetuation of 
violent extremism. 
4. COMMUNITY DIALOGUE 
Coordinators should do their best to develop programs that provide women a meaningful 
opportunity to contribute to conversations. Facilitators should actively encourage women’s 




communities, women’s spaces may be a good way to ensure that women have a meaningful 
opportunity to express themselves. 
5. COMMUNITY POLICING 
Community policing strategies are unlikely to successfully address conditions of violent 
extremism unless the relationship between the police and the community is based on mutual 
trust and respect. Programs that instrumentalize community members may further damage 
the community’s relationship with security forces.  
6. CAPACITY BUILDING 
As noted above, capacity building is an important element of many PCVE programs.  
Programs that focus primarily on capacity building should have the dual goal of preventing 
and countering violent extremism and promoting women’s equality.  By considering both 
goals simultaneously, these programs can avoid instrumentalizing women’s participation but 
instead ensure that women are both active contributors and beneficiaries in PCVE efforts.  
Moreover, by promoting women’s equality, program interventions are likely to be more 
sustainable and have lasting effects as women develop their ability to become change agents 
and leaders in the PCVE effort.  
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TUNISIA COUNTRY PROFILE 
Tunisia is widely recognized as one of the most progressive countries in the Arab world. 
After a largely peaceful transition to democracy, Tunisia’s new constitution contains robust 
human rights protections, including non-discrimination and gender equality provisions, 
freedom of religion guarantees, due process protections, and various socio-economic rights.1 
Tunisia has also signed on to various human rights treaties, further expressing its 
commitment to human rights and protected freedoms.2  
Nonetheless, Tunisia has recently been the target of various terrorist attacks and has 
responded with security policies and practices that concern human rights activists. More 
youth travel abroad to join violent extremist groups from Tunisia than perhaps from any 
other country; some estimates indicate that 7,000 people, mostly youth, have left Tunisia to 
join violent extremist groups since the conflict began. 3  With approximately half of its 
population under thirty, 4  developing a response to violent extremism that honors its 
expressed commitment to gender equality and human rights poses a difficult challenge for 
Tunisia. 
These complex dynamics have made Tunisia an interesting case study for this research. This 
profile explores how Tunisia’s commitment to protecting human rights, and more specifically, 
women’s rights, intersects with its approach to preventing and countering violent extremism.  
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN TUNISIA 
Violent extremism and recruitment for violent extremist groups has increased steadily in 
Tunisia since the Revolution in 2011.5 That same year, Tunisia experienced four significant 
terror events. In 2013, these events were followed by an attempt to bomb the seaside towns 
of Sousse and Monastir.6 In 2015, several deadly attacks occurred: an attack at the Bardo 
National Museum that resulted in twenty lives lost (including seventeen tourists),7 an attack 
on the Sousse beaches resulting in thirty-nine deaths,8 and a suicide bombing in Tunis which 
“killed [twelve] members of the presidential guard.”9 In recent years, many attacks have been 
linked to the Islamic State (also “ISIS,” “ISIL,” or “Daesh”). 10  Most recently, Tunisian 
extremists have been accused of perpetrating violence in France, including the 2015 massacre 
at Charlie Hebdo and the 2016 Bastille Day attack in Nice.11 
The southern and central regions of the Tunisia are thought to be particularly vulnerable to 
extremism, due in part to their proximity to the instability in Libya.12 In addition to the 
approximately 7,000 Tunisians who have left the country to join extremist organizations 
abroad,13 estimates indicate that about 3,000 Tunisians are currently fighting with violent 
extremist groups14  and approximately 700–800 trained fighters have returned to Tunisia.15 
With more Tunisians joining extremist organizations abroad, dual concerns regarding state 




government has increased its security efforts aimed at combatting extremism, including an 
updated antiterrorism law, extending some police powers such as pre-trial detention time, 
and lifting a halt on the death penalty.16 But organizations such as Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International, among others, have expressed concerns about the human rights 
consequences of these efforts.17 Namely, concerns are that people have been questioned, 
searched, and detained in the absence of any credible evidence linking them to terrorism, 
sometimes with convictions secured by confessions that were extracted largely through 
torture.18 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND WOMEN   
While significantly fewer Tunisian women join violent extremist organizations than men, 
Tunisia has a relatively large proportion of female fighters in comparison to other countries.19 
Reports estimate as many as 700 women have joined extremist groups.20 This means that 
around 10 percent of people who have left Tunisia to join foreign fighters are women. The 
government has estimated that 100-500 women have left the country specifically for “sexual 
jihad,” but civil society organizations put the number closer to 300–400.21 
As more than one activist noted, female participants in violent extremism are often 
characterized as victims, citing examples of deception and forced sexual services, but the 
perception that women are only joining organizations under coercive circumstances has 
slowly eroded. 22  In fact, some have speculated that women are actively recruited by 
organizations because they are less likely to be suspected by authorities.23 Some suggest that 
women may be particularly good recruits because they may commit more readily and 
ardently to extremist ideology than men.24 One trend appears to be to recruit middle-class, 
educated women. 25  According to stakeholders, women actively participate in extremist 
activities, by serving as look-outs, recruiting other members in person or online, assisting 
with information technology and computers or otherwise supporting their plans.26 
Women are likely recruited by the same means as men—through social media, friends and 
mosques.27 Women are also often recruited through association with male family members 
who have joined extremist organizations.28 Additionally, young women may be introduced to 
extremist groups through romantic partners.29 
DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Stakeholders in Tunisia posit a number of driving forces of violent extremism that may lead 
to the adoption of these views. While opinions vary greatly on this issue, some common 
themes in Tunisia are: the breakdown of the family unit; violence in the family; economic 
incentives; breakdown of the Tunisian national identity; and abuses by the security state.30  
The breakdown of the family unit was cited by those interviewed by researchers as a potential 




parental influence has eroded in Tunisian society.31 They suggested that teenagers have a 
difficult time communicating openly with their parents, which has led them to talk more to 
peers in person or online.32 Unsurprisingly, social media recruitment by extremist groups is 
relatively common in Tunisia, because of these changing communication patterns.33  
Violence in the family was also identified as potential reason for high recruitment of foreign 
fighters from Tunisia. As a current study indicates, Tunisian children are exposed to physical 
and verbal violence within the family unit or at school, usually within the context of 
disciplinary practices. 34  In fact, 94 percent of children aged 4–18 reported exposure to 
violence in some form in Tunisian society, according to the study. 35  UNICEF Tunisia 
theorizes that exposure to childhood violence may desensitize Tunisians to the violence 
associated with extremist groups. 36 Research generally supports this theory, with research 
finding that children exposed to physical punishment are more likely to engage in violent 
behavior later in life.37 
Economic incentives are considered relevant to many people’s decisions to assist and join 
violent extremist groups. High unemployment rates in Tunisia, especially in many of the 
rural areas closest to the Libyan border, are thought to encourage extremism.38 Extremist 
groups will compensate people for material assistance, such as the provision of food, or even 
offer salaries to people who join the group full time.39 In Tunisia, this economic benefit can 
be appealing to a wide range of people; it is relatively common for educated people not to be 
able to find skilled work in Tunisia.40 There are high unemployment rates in Tunisia; one 
study suggested that as many as 35 percent of people aged 25–29 are unemployed.41 Some 
researchers speculate that an education bubble has burst in Tunisia, with many recent 
college graduates unable to find work.42 This may be a particular problem in rural areas. 
Stakeholders report that women do most of types of menial work in rural areas, and that men 
feel that this kind of work is beneath them.43 As a result, rural men in particular often cannot 
find skilled work and sometimes will resort to assisting or joining extremist groups. 44 
Another stakeholder believed that men see women as the cause of their unemployment 
problems, and may join extremist groups that advocate divesting women of their rights and 
economic opportunities.45 Such a divestment would theoretically open the jobs that women 
currently hold to men, giving them yet another economic motivation to join extremist 
groups.46 
The breakdown of Tunisian national identity is another potential factor that may influence 
Tunisians to join violent extremist groups. According to one stakeholder, many young people 
view themselves as Muslim first and Tunisian second, indicating a higher sense of affiliation 
and identification with religion than country.47 Some stakeholders thought that this identity 
crisis was a natural part of the revolution.48 Other stakeholders thought that extremist 
rhetoric is especially appealing to youth in this moment, as rebellion against the state offers 
one way of defining themselves.49 A few stakeholders suggested that young people have lost 




the revolution, or because they are being actively victimized by the government and state 
security measures.50 
Finally, abuses by the security state may be pushing people toward extremist organizations. 
As explained later in the report, police often arbitrarily detain or arrest people because of 
their associations with certain mosques, imams, or other individuals who are suspected of 
extremist activity.51 This victimization of communities by the government is thought to 
contribute to the breakdown of national identity, pride, and loyalty to the country. Another 
potential problem stakeholders identified is radicalization in prison. It appears that Tunisia 
does not currently have a system for separating prisoners that adequately isolates violent 
extremists, so that returning foreign fighters are housed in the general population. This 
exposes the general population to violent extremists and their rhetoric, and converts prisons 
into recruitment centers for violent extremist groups.52 
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN TUNISIA 
As noted, women’s equality has historically been an important element of Tunisian identity.53 
Tunisia gained its independence from France in 1956, under the leadership of Habib 
Bourguiba. Only three months after the country declared its independence, the Code of 
Personal Status was promulgated.54 The Code was seen by many as a victory for women’s 
rights in Tunisia: it abolished polygamy, replaced repudiation55 with legal divorce, available 
to both genders on an equal basis, and ended “matrimonial guardianship.”56 In 1993, the Code 
was expanded. 57  The expanded Code replaced paternal authority with shared parental 
authority that required the consent of both the mother and father before a minor could marry, 
allowed a woman to obtain full guardianship after divorce, and permitted her to represent 
her children in legal matters.58  Article 23 of the Code describes the concept of mutual 
“benevolence” in marriage.59 Tunisian women have enjoyed the most progressive laws and 
rights in the Arab region,60 including reproductive and family planning rights, both of which 
were actively promoted by the Bourguiba administration.61  
Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution reflects its long-standing dedication to ensuring gender equality. 
The Preamble to the 2014 Constitution expresses “respect for . . . human rights, . . . [and] the 
equality of rights and duties between all citizens, male and female.”62 Article 21 guarantees 
a positive right to “equal rights and duties,” and “equal[ity] before the law without any 
discrimination,” to “[a]ll citizens, male and female.”63 In Article 34, the state expresses its 
intention to “guarantee women’s representation in elected bodies.”64 Article 40 obliges the 
state to “take necessary measures” to ensure employment nondiscrimination.65 Article 74 
contemplates female candidates for President of the Republic. 66  In Article 46 of the 
Constitution, the state commits to taking affirmative measures to “protect women’s accrued 
rights and work to strengthen and develop those rights” including gender equality within 
government and elected bodies as well as the eradication of violence against women.67 To this 
end, one of the most progressive, complete draft laws on domestic violence in the Arab world 




INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS ON WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS 
Tunisia’s treaty ratifications are aligned with its commitment to women’s rights. Tunisia’s 
constitution states that treaties and international law are the supreme law of the country.69 
Tunisia ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (“CEDAW”) in 198570 and, in 2014, lifted all reservations to CEDAW. In the 2010 
report from the CEDAW Committee on Tunisia, the Committee expressed concern over the 
rise in incidents of violence against women, and urged the Tunisian legislature to create a 
law that would clearly define and criminalize all forms of violence against women, especially 
including protections for women wearing the hijab from harassment by public and private 
individuals.71 The Committee also expressed concerns about women’s political participation, 
education and literacy. However, the Committee was especially concerned with allegations 
of arbitrary arrest and harassment against non-governmental organizations and human 
rights defenders which can weaken protections more generally for women.72 The Committee 
still regards Tunisia as a model of gender equality for most other Muslim and Arab 
countries.73 
As a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),74 Tunisia 
is also committed to respecting the rights of those accused of crimes and those imprisoned or 
held in detention, which can include women suspects.75 In the 2008 ICCPR report on Tunisia, 
the ICCPR Human Rights Committee expressed concern about the broad definition of 
terrorism in Tunisia’s criminal code, citing potential violations of Article 6 (right to life), 
Article 7 (right against torture and degrading treatment) and Article 14 (rights of accused 
persons).76 Tunisia is also a party to the Convention Against Torture, which it ratified in 1988 
with no reservations.77 The definition of torture in the convention is relatively broad,78 and 
accusations have been leveled against the government under the treaty for torture and 
mistreatment during detention of violent extremist suspects, including women who are 
suspected returning foreign fighters.79 
CURRENT WOMEN’S RIGHTS CONCERNS IN TUNISIA 
Following its report to the CEDAW Committee, Tunisia reaffirmed the state’s commitment 
to “take all necessary measures in order to eradicate violence against women.” 80  The 
government has taken some steps in this direction. It has conducted a comprehensive study 
on violence against women from 2006–2009, spearheaded a program entitled “Gender 
Equality and Prevention of Violence against Women” in 2006, and created a national strategy 
to help address the prevention of gender based violence.81 In August 2004, the Penal Code 
was amended to criminalize sexual harassment.82 However, problems persist despite these 
steps to eradicate gendered violence. In 2010, one article suggested that 47.6 percent of 
Tunisian women between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four had experienced some form of 
violence.83 A 2015 report suggests that one in six of these women have experienced sexual 




revolution. A 2014 study found “a marked increase in violence against women, including 
sexual violence, since the revolution. According to the police’s own statistics, 46 women were 
killed in the first ten months of 2013 (as compared to thirty-four for the same period in 2012). 
90 percent of these crimes were committed by the victim’s partner.”85 
Stakeholders managing a domestic violence shelter and service center note that “legislative 
responses to violence [against women] remain largely insufficient.”86 A serious gap in the 
current Penal Code, reported by Amnesty International, “allow[s] men accused of raping a 
girl or woman aged between 15 and 20 to escape prosecution by marrying their victim,”87 and 
reforms “continue[ ] to reflect discriminatory social attitudes against women and [fail to] 
preserve the general needs of survivors.”88 The prejudices of judges, traditional attitudes 
regarding gender roles within the home, and high standards of proof may also act as 
aggravating factors in the effective prosecution of perpetrators of violence against women.89 
The Guardian reports that, between 2012 and 2013, “two-thirds of the 5,575 complaints of 
marital violence lodged with the authorities were withdrawn or dismissed; only 10% resulted 
in convictions.” 90  The publication also observed that “police may refuse to investigate 
complaints and allegations—and sometimes they are the perpetrators.”91  
Another significant restriction of women’s rights manifests in the context of religious 
expression. President Habib Bourguiba referred to veils as “wretched rag[s]” and “dreadful 
shroud[s],” and was criticized for mocking the religious concept of virginity.92 Bourguiba also 
banned the niqab93 in schools, and “[o]nce, on camera, [ ] removed a hair-covering from a 
woman in the street.” 94  Bourguiba’s successor communicated a similar stance towards 
women’s religious expression; President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali “once reportedly said that 
the hijab95 was something foreign and not part of Tunisian culture,”96 and, “[u]nder Ben Ali, 
visible signs of faith, such as a man’s beard or a woman’s niqab, became cause for harassment 
by security forces.”97 Tunisian society appears to have a complex relationship with women’s 
religious expression, particularly in its discomfort with their religious garb. Research 
exploring cultural attitudes in Tunisia suggests that, while “Tunisians are now generally 
very tolerant of religious dress that might be considered moderate, like the hijab . . . the vast 
majority of citizens describe themselves as still ‘completely against’ the wearing of more 
dramatic religious attire like the niqab.”98 The Pew Research Center reported in 2016 that 
“Tunisia is the only country in the Arab world and Africa where women report being harassed 
for dressing too liberally and too conservatively.”99 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
The government response to the increasing threat of violent extremism has been primarily 
security based. In 2015, Tunisia passed an updated antiterrorism law, in the wake of the 
Bardo attack, which “extend[ed] some police powers such as pre-trial detention time, and 
lift[ed] a halt on [the] death penalty.”100 The law grants security forces broad and vague 
monitoring and surveillance powers; extends incommunicado detention (where the detainee 




suspects, during which time detainees cannot see a lawyer or family members, and cannot go 
before a judge; permits courts to close hearings to the public; and allows witnesses to remain 
anonymous to the defendants.101  Human rights workers characterize these measures as 
restrictions of due process that violate many of Tunisia’s constitutional and international 
obligations.102  
The law also creates a National Commission on Counterterrorism, a joint commission 
designed to bring together members of different ministries to advise on future laws and 
design counterterrorism methods.103  While the Commission can incorporate civil society 
organizations, they have not yet been added as members. The Parliament also created a 
Commission on the Recruitment of fighters, with members from the Ministry of Justice, 
Interior, and Defense, to further investigate the processes by which people are connected to 
extremist groups.104 It is unclear whether these new bodies will bolster the human rights 
aspects of current national programs. 
Other due process violations that are frequently reported include arbitrary raids, house 
arrests105 and detentions, especially for those suspected of extremist activity.106 There are an 
estimated 1,500 returning foreign fighters in prison in Tunisia.107 Most alarmingly, Amnesty 
International has found evidence that security forces frequently torture detainees during 
both interrogation and detention.108 
Furthermore, under the guise of increasing security concerns, the Ministry of the Interior 
announced in 2014 that “it would introduce stricter controls on the niqab.”109 According to 
the Ministry, such controls are necessary because “suspects and fugitives deliberately wear 
niqab for disguise and to escape from security units.”110 As of April 2016, Tunisia did not 
appear to officially regulate women’s religious dress,111 but draft legislation was submitted 
to Parliament on March 18, 2016—the one-year anniversary the Bardo attack112—that would 
ban the niqab in public places.113 The 2016 bill was passed into law on July 5, 2019.114 
Despite these findings, some organizations perceive the government as more receptive to 
taking a human rights approach in addressing violent extremism than other governments. 
According to one interviewee, Tunisia stands out as being one of the first governments to 
recognize that approaches to counterterrorism must be multifaceted—including education, 
media, restrictions on hate speech, the judiciary and social policies, to name a few examples. 
However, public perceptions of the risk of violent extremism—undoubtedly stoked by media 
coverage of these events—have made it more difficult to maintain a human rights approach 
to counterterrorism.   
As part of its broader strategy to combat violent extremism, the Tunisian government has 
also focused on the regulation of mosques. In Tunisia, mosques must be registered by law 
with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, but around 20 percent of mosques fell out of 
government control as a result of the revolution.115 In addition, “[c]lose to 200 new mosques 




government. 116  The Ministry believes that “[m]any of these mosques came under the 
influence of groups espousing extremist interpretations of Islam.”117 The Ministry is now 
working closely with imams, taking an active role in monitoring the content of meetings and 
services, and censoring hate speech and political discussion.118  However, concerns have been 
expressed that the Ministry has made control of mosques largely a police responsibility, 
focusing on security, rather than education and dialogue.119 
For similar reasons, the stakeholders, including the Ministry of Women, Family, and 
Children, have advocated for licensure of early childhood education centers. Currently, 
preschools and schools for children under the age of five are unregulated by the 
government.120 Partners of the Ministry have expressed concern that unlicensed centers may 
teach extreme religious ideology by extoling the virtues of female genital mutilation, coercing 
very small girls to cover themselves, allowing children to play with fake weapons, and 
teaching them to sing extreme songs.121  
Unofficial travel restrictions to destinations outside Tunisia has been another government 
strategy for discouraging extremism. Men and women under the age of thirty-five were, until 
recently, not permitted to travel without the explicit consent of their parents.122 These travel 
restrictions were implemented unofficially, arbitrarily, and often with little basis, according 
to stakeholders. 123  There have been reports that passport registration has also been 
decentralized, making it significantly harder to complete necessary paperwork.124 Reports 
indicate that the Ministry of the Interior has been barring specific individuals from travel 
abroad, and even ordering their arrest, through “S-10” and “S-17” forms, unofficial 
government travel approval mechanisms. Though reports have come from various sectors, 
there has been no confirmation or government acknowledgment of their existence.125 
The government also launched a media campaign called Ghodwa khir (“Tomorrow will be 
better”) in March 2016.126 This program aimed to “promote Islam’s real, moderate values” 
through the dissemination of “recorded sermons and religious seminars” available on the 
web, “awareness programs on public and private radio and television stations,” a helpline 
“for youths with questions about religion” and classes in mosques supervised by “authorized 
imams and preachers.”127 
NON-GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Civil society in Tunisia has turned its attention towards extremism and established various 
programs to address it. A summary of programming of stakeholders IHCHR engaged with 





UNION DES TUNISIENS INDÉPENDANTS POUR LA LIBERTÉ 
Union des Tunisiens Indépendants pour la Liberté (“UTIL”) is a civil society organization 
that primarily works on political participation and democracy building in Tunisia. Its work 
in PCVE programs falls into three main categories: 1) media campaigns, 2) direct intervention 
in prisons, and 3) direct intervention through youth engagement. UTIL’s media campaign 
distributes debates and lessons on Islam, lessons on Tunisian history and culture, and 
testimonials by family members of foreign fighters, in order to present counter narratives 
and provide moderate education. UTIL has also facilitated at least one meeting between 
parents and their children detained for suspected participation in extremist activities abroad. 
UTIL explained this kind of direct intervention with suspected extremists abroad can have a 
de-radicalizing effect. UTIL is also in the process of developing a direct intervention program 
for youth. There are currently about 650 defunct and underutilized young centers around 
Tunisia, and UTIL is working to help fund and direct social and cultural programming to 
give youth access to sports, music and film.128  
UNION NATIONALE DE LA FEMME TUNISIENNE 
The Union Nationale de la Femme Tunisienne (“UNFT”) is a women’s rights advocacy 
organization that has had a longstanding historical influence on the development of women’s 
rights in Tunisia. Relevant to the prevention of violent extremism, this group is the driving 
force behind a monthly rural women’s assistance program. UNFT’s development program 
provides material assistance to women, such as clothing, furniture, and other forms of 
economic assistance. It also provides professional skills development, which can include 
training in sewing, embroidery, weaving, leather work or agricultural skills, such as small 
animal care and beekeeping, as well as hosting sporting events for younger girls. UNFT 
estimates that about 60–70 women participate at each event. UNFT believes that one of the 
main drivers of violent extremism is poverty, and believe that their program, which both 
economically assists these communities and develops their professional skills, has real 
potential to decrease violent extremism. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
The International Institute for Human Development (“IIHD”) has three primary counter 
violent extremist programs: (1) Women for Peace and Security (“W4PS”); (2) 1325 Trainings; 
and (3) direct intervention through youth engagement. The W4PS program is part media 
campaign and part capacity building. IIHD hopes to eventually train two men and two 
women from each district or community across Tunisia to act as “peace ambassadors” and 
community leaders to communicate with others who have been personally impacted by 
extremist activities.129 After attending a day and a half training about the causes of violent 
extremism and different international counter extremism models, IIHD supports the peace 




also engages these ambassadors to produce a media campaign, comprised of a series of short 
films that detail how terrorism has impacted their lives. 
The 1325 Trainings are capacity building training sessions for police women, aimed at 
empowering them and educating them about UN Security Counsel Resolution 1325, which 
urges all state actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender 
perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. IIHD hopes to encourage female 
police officers to actively seek promotions so that women can have more say in the 
development of counterterrorism and security strategies. IIHD has held one 1325 Training 
conference and held half day trainings dedicated to educating Tunisian female police officers 
about the resolution. It believes that building these officers’ capacity will allow them to more 
actively participate in national counterterrorism programs and strategies, and that women’s 
participation will help make these strategies more effective.130 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES 
Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) Tunisia recently spearheaded a media campaign called “No 
to Terrorism, Yes to Human Rights,” which primarily consisted of videos communicating the 
potential negative consequences of security measures against ordinary Tunisians.131 While 
this is a not intuitively a PCVE program, its goal was to improve state and security relations 
by improving the state’s ability to effectively engage in programs and prevention efforts with 
a human-rights focus. The videos featured four subjects: a filmmaker, a traveler, a woman 
hurt by crossfire and an individual who was wrongfully detained. The preliminary results 
were positive, with a measurable decrease in attacks against and criticisms of human rights 
groups. As the director noted, however, the real test will come if and when Tunisia 
experiences another significant terror event as backlash against human rights organizations 
could occur. On television, HRW has been called “Zionist,” “US-backed,” and “traitors with a 
hidden agenda.”132 On social media, the Human Rights Watch is sometimes referred to as the 
“Terrorist Rights Watch.”133  
The United Nations Development Program (“UNDP”) is supporting the government on two 
different PCVE programs.134 The first is focused on community policing135 and consists of 
workshops for local security forces, and the rehabilitation of some office buildings into “model 
stations.”136 UNDP has also hosted a three day conference that brought together popular 
youth bloggers and imams in community dialogue, allowing them to talk about social media 
and violent extremist rhetoric.137 
* *   * 
In Tunisia, civil society organizations appear to be taking laudable steps to address the threat 
of violent extremism in a more nuanced and holistic way. While the government has focused 
primarily on security approaches to violent extremism, civil society actors appear to be filling 




seen whether critical funding and resources needed to carry them through their first years 
will materialize. In addition, Tunisian efforts addressing violent extremism appear not to 
address the needs of returnees—that is, while Tunisian civil society has begun to concern 
itself with “preventing” violent extremism, it does not seem similarly poised to “counter” it. 
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KENYA COUNTRY PROFILE 
Violent extremism poses a serious threat to Kenya. Although the country has faced threats 
from domestic groups, Somali-based Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (“Al Shabab”) and, 
more recently, the Islamic State (also, “ISIS,” “ISIL” or “Daesh”) are the major perpetrators 
of violent extremism and radicalization in the country today. The government has 
predominantly taken an aggressive approach to terror threats and radicalization efforts.  
Kenyan authorities’ counter-terrorism effort includes religious and ethnic profiling of Kenyan 
Somalis, extra-judicial killings and arbitrary arrests by the Anti-Terror Police Unit. 
Unfortunately, these efforts have, in some cases, served to “push” individuals toward 
radicalization. As a result, Kenya is now attempting a more inclusive, “softer” approach 
through its National Countering Violence Extremism Strategy. This includes working with 
civil society organizations to address the driving reasons behind radicalization. 
Notwithstanding these efforts, significant steps still must be taken to break the cycle of 
radicalization, and to implement effective PCVE strategies at the regional level.  
This Section explores how Kenya’s commitment to protecting human rights and more 
specifically, women’s rights intersects with its approach to preventing and countering violent 
extremism 
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA 
A host of factors make Kenya vulnerable to domestic and transnational violent extremism. 
These include the country’s ethnic composition, lack of internal political stability, geography, 
unstable neighbors, as well as Islamic fundamentalism, poverty and ineffective law 
enforcement. On the domestic front, the threat of violent extremism in the country is due to 
several small-scale militant factions. The most prominent of these factions is the MRC, which 
advocates for the city of Mombasa’s secession from Kenya.1 Law enforcement agencies held 
MRC responsible for the attack on a popular Italian-owned casino in Malinidi in March 2013 
that claimed eight lives.2 Terrorist attacks have had a devastating impact on Kenya’s tourism 
industry, which provides a vital source of jobs and income for the country. The Kenya Tourism 
Board has estimated a 25 percent drop in tourism due to terrorism.3 In one case, hundreds of 
British tourists were evacuated from beach resorts near Mombasa in May 2014, following 
warnings from the Foreign Office.4 
International groups—Al-Qaida’s affiliate in Somalia, Al-Shabab, and more recently the 
Islamic State—are now the greatest threats to Kenya’s security. Al-Shabab has been fighting 
an insurgency in Somalia for more than a decade. Al-Shabab has targeted Kenya for the 
country’s role in the global war on terror and its 2011 military invasion of Somalia as part of 
the African Union Forces in Somalia (“AMISOM”). 56 Between 2011 and 2015 alone, more 
than 200 attacks targeting markets, night-clubs, and places of worships with explosives or 
automatic weapons were linked to Al-Shabab.7  The group claimed responsibility for the 




More than 60 people were killed, including women and children, and more than 150 were 
wounded during a four-day siege.8 Al-Shabab also has a history of executing bold military 
attacks against armed forces personnel and the government. In January 2016, it claimed to 
have killed more than 100 Kenyan soldiers during a raid conducted at the AMISOM base in 
Somalia. It released propaganda video footage of the raid in April 2016.9   
Kenya has also become a prime location for Al-Shabab’s recruitment and radicalization 
efforts.10 The group targets recent converts to Islam, particularly residing in the coastal areas 
of the country. Typically described as “young” and “zealous,” these converts can be difficult 
to detect and monitor, as they blend in easily with the general population. It was estimated 
in December 2014 that 25 percent of Al-Shabab personnel were Kenyan.11 Elgiva Bwire 
Oliacha represents a well-known example of this kind of homegrown violent extremism. The 
28-year-old Kenyan national pled guilty to a grenade attack in Nairobi that wounded over 
two dozen people.12 He proclaimed that he was a member of Al-Shabab in court and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The Islamic State has also starting making inroads in Kenya. It operates online and in 
universities, and has become effective in recruitment.13 Rashid Abdi, senior analyst at the 
International Crisis Group think tank in Nairobi, contends that “there is now a real threat 
that Kenya faces from ISIS, and the danger will continue to increase.”14 The statement is 
corroborated by the Kenyan intelligence agencies estimates in 2016 that around 100 men and 
women went to Syria and Libya to join ISIS.15  
WOMEN AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA  
Al-Shabab and ISIS16 are increasingly targeting women to radicalize and engage them as 
fighters in the region.17 Women were involved in the Al-Shabab’s September 2016 attack in 
Mombasa. 18  Previously, there were reports of “Al-Shabab brides” arrested in Northeast 
Kenya on their way to join militants in Somalia.19   
Many speculate that women are recruited because they are thought to be less likely to be 
suspected of violent extremism, less likely to be seen as “posing an imminent threat,” and 
“able to travel” without raising suspicion.20  While women in Kenya join violent extremist 
efforts as “sympathizers, facilitators and perpetrators,”21 they tend to act as recruiting agents 
rather than participating in combat roles.22  
Various factors have been identified as encouraging women to join extremist causes. The 
ostracization and marginalization of “women left behind” by male family members who have 
gone to fight with ISIS or Al-Shabab, or have been killed or abducted by Kenyan security 
forces, can serve as push factor for those women.23 Exploitation of women by security forces, 
including sexual violence, can sometimes lead women towards violent extremist ideology.24 
Some Kenyan women are pulled to join Al-Shabab and ISIS in hopes to achieve martyrdom 




groups. 25  For instance, some women have gone to Somalia to find their “disappeared” 
husbands only to be abducted or threatened with violence to participate in violent activities.26 
Al-Shabab has forced some of these women into sexual slavery.27 Other women are trafficked 
to Somalia, and still others are pulled by the promise of large dowries, only to be forced to 
join Al-Shabab after marriage.28 
DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Independent organizations and government actors, in collaboration with local and 
international civil society organizations, are conducting research to understand the general 
drivers of violent extremism and radicalization in Kenya—that is, the “push” and “pull” 
factors for “at risk” individuals. One such study, Countering Violent Extremism and Risk 
Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation, conducted by the Royal United 
Services Institute (“RUSI”), explains the structural motivators, individual incentives, and 
enabling factors for “at risk” individuals in Kenya.29 Individual incentives can include “a 
sense of purpose (generated through acting in accordance with perceived ideological tenets), 
adventure, belonging, acceptance, status, material enticements, fear of repercussions by 
violent extremism groups, [and] expected rewards in the afterlife.” 30  This finding is 
corroborated by another study, Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of Al-
Shabaab and Somali Youth, drawn from interviews with former Al-Shabaab members.31 The 
study reports that those who joined the group were seen by some as “heroes for defending the 
country and religion.”32 
Another study, Radicalization in Kenya, involving interviews of 95 Al-Shabab fighters, finds 
that although ideology plays an important role in recruitment efforts, social, political, and 
economic oppression are primary reasons motivating individuals to join the group.33 Other 
structural issues acting as push factors include “repression, corruption, unemployment, 
inequality, discrimination, a history of hostility between identity groups, [and] external state 
interventions in the affairs of other nations.”34  
Unemployment, inequality and marginalization were also common push factors mentioned 
during IHRC in-country research.35 Young disenfranchised Kenyan men, often from poor 
neighborhoods, are lured into Somalia with the promise of good jobs and large salaries.36 
Upon reaching the country, they are coerced under threat of violence to join Al-Shabab and 
undergo military training.37 In contrast, some young men have described Al-Shabab as a 
“business,” and have joined the group willingly to make money.38 International Crisis Group 
supports this narrative, having found that Al-Shabab “pays its soldiers and operatives well 
and regularly, as well as provides for its veterans and the families of the martyrs.”39 Another 
report concludes that Al-Shabab “capitalizes on . . . unemployment and feelings of 
marginalization to recruit.”40 The MRC similarly derives its support from local discontent 
about “long-held grievances over land and frustration at the perceived economic 




Counterterrorism measures resulting in human rights violations, including excessive use of 
force, extra judicial killings, police raids and disappearances of suspects and their families, 
also act as push factors in Kenya. 42  A lack of trust in ineffective and corrupt public 
institutions is also a driver of violent extremism in the country.43 Researchers have identified 
“the presence of radical mentors (including religious leaders and individuals from social 
networks, among others), access to radical online communities, social networks with VE 
associations, access to weaponry or other relevant items, a comparative lack of state presence, 
[and] an absence of familial support” as enabling factors.44 ISIS and Al-Shabab both have 
effective online recruitment techniques, often targeting both men and women at 
universities.45 
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN KENYA 
Women’s struggle for empowerment and human rights in Kenya has been an uphill battle 
against patriarchy, poverty, discrimination and exclusion from political decision-making.46 
Although the 2010 Kenyan Constitution47 provides a legal framework to ensure basic human 
rights for women and girls, women still face considerable challenges, including in obtaining 
positions of political leadership. Women and girls are disadvantaged in the economic and 
education spheres, in gaining employment and accessing financial assets. Eighty percent of 
Kenyan women are engaged in small holder farming, but only 1 percent own land. Women 
have access to less than 10 percent of available credit, and less than 1 percent of agricultural 
credit. 48  High rates of poverty among women is exacerbated by gender-based violence, 
including rape, sexual harassment and other sexual violence. According to the 2014 Kenya 
Demographic and Health Survey, 4 out of every 10 women in Kenya have experienced some 
form of violence, whether physical or sexual. 49  Rural women in Kenya are the most 
marginalized as traditional gender roles that define divisions of labor make them politically, 
economically, and socially dependent on men. 
Kenya has introduced several policies and legislation promoting gender equality and 
protection of women and girls. These include: a Presidential Decree that women constitute 
30 percent of formal appointees to public posts; a ban on female genital mutilation;50 the 
establishment of Family Courts and a Gender Commission; women-specific police stations 
and gender desks in Government Ministries, police stations, and parastatals; the Gender 
Policy Bill and the Sexual Offenses Act; and other legal instruments.51  Kenya has also 
launched a Joint Programme on Prevention and Response to Gender Based Violence 2017–
2020 to “accelerate efforts towards the elimination of [gender based violence] in Kenya.”52 
Despite these and other advancements, female political candidates have faced hurdles, such 
as verbal and physical abuse during campaigns53 and sexual violence during the post-election 
violence of 2007–2008.54 
Under the Constitution of Kenya, all international and regional treaties, conventions and 
laws among other instruments ratified by Kenya form part of the country’s laws.55 Kenya has 




several core international treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”). Kenya has not, however, ratified the Optional Protocol to CEDAW.56 At 
the regional level, Kenya is party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(“ACHPR”), and has ratified the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and 
the Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Kenya has also 
ratified the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, but it does not accept the Court’s jurisdiction on individual complaints.57 
Kenya has not ratified the Maputo Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.58  
In 2011, the CEDAW Committee provided recommendations to the Kenyan government to 
improve women’s human rights in the country. The Committee expressed concern at the high 
prevalence of sexual violence against women and girls and recommended that Kenya 
“respond to the existing culture of underreporting and impunity by criminalizing marital 
rape and investigating, prosecuting and punishing perpetrators of sexual violence.”59 The 
Committee urged the government to adopt a “comprehensive strategy to modify or eliminate 
harmful practices and stereotypes that discriminate against women, in conformity with . . . 
[CEDAW].”60  
In 2012, the Human Rights Committee expressed concern about “acts of physical and sexual 
violence by the police towards refugees following bomb explosions that claimed the lives of 
some police officers at Dadaab camp.”61 The Committee urged the Kenyan government to 
“conduct thorough investigations into all incidents of violence including allegations of 
violence by law enforcement personnel and bring those responsible to justice.” 62  The 
Committee further highlighted concern over the “lack of a legal framework that clearly sets 
out the human rights that must be respected in the fight against terrorism.”63 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Kenya has taken an aggressive approach to countering extremism at home and abroad.64 It 
has passed several pieces of legislation, including its first Anti-Terrorism Law in 2012, the 
Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2011), the Prevention of Organized 
Crime Act (2010), and the Security Laws (Amendment) Act (2014) (“SLAA”). These laws 
establish a strong legal framework to prosecute acts of terrorism.65  The SLAA contains 
several measures that strengthen the mandate of Kenya’s National Counter-Terrorism 
Centre to fight terrorism. These include “broadening evidentiary standards to allow greater 
use of electronic evidence and recorded testimony in terrorism prosecutions” and 
criminalization of participation in terrorist training.66 Civil society and political opposition 
have objected to these and other provisions of the SLAA on grounds that they contravene 




International and domestic civil society organizations have voiced serious concerns over the 
government’s approach to counterterrorism. Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) Kenya has 
investigated disappearances and renditions of individuals suspected or accused of terrorism 
or extremist activities. It found that military and police excesses take place routinely in the 
name of counterterrorism and efforts to counter violent extremism and that a variety of 
activities are labeled “terrorism” without proper investigation.68 In response, the government 
acts disproportionately against entire communities after incidents of violence, regardless of 
whether the violence was ideologically motivated or more traditional criminal activity. 
During these community raids, authorities have abducted and disappeared individuals 
suspected of VE, according the HRW Kenya.69  
Operation Usalma Watch, carried out in Nairobi in April 2014, is cited as a disturbing 
example of the government’s flawed approach to PCVE.70 The operation was launched after 
a series of grenade and gun attacks in Mombasa and Eastleigh, a predominantly Somali 
neighborhood in Nairobi. During the weeks-long raids conducted by approximately 5,000 
security forces, an estimated 4,000 individuals, including journalists, Kenyan citizens, 
registered refugees and international aid workers, were harassed and detained.71 According 
to Amnesty International’s Eastern Africa office, Operation Uslama Watch was “used as a 
pretext for the blanket punishment of the Somali community in Kenya.”72 She argued that 
Somalis were treated as “scapegoats with thousands arrested and ill-treated, forcibly 
relocated and hundreds unlawfully expelled to a war-torn country.” 73  These claims are 
supported by the fact that more than 1,000 Somalis, including breast-feeding women 
separated from their infants, were forcibly relocated to Northern Kenya’s overcrowded, 
insecure refugee camps.74 
The lack of coordination between different arms of law enforcement and military in 
conducting counterterrorism and PCVE measures is also an area of concern for stakeholders. 
The 2013 Westgate Mall attack and the 2015 Garrisa School attack are key examples of this.75 
In both cases, the lack of coordination between military and specialized tactical units has 
been blamed for unnecessary deaths and the elongation of sieges.76  
Corruption by Kenyan authorities in implementing counterterrorism and PCVE appear to be 
a major concern. During Operation Uslama Watch, residents bribed law enforcement officials 
to prevent them from raiding their homes.77 Reports indicate that authorities unlawfully 
detain Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees in order to receive bribes for their release.78 In 
some cases, authorities refer to these groups as “cash-cows,” in reference to the system of 
detention and bribery.79 Muslim women are especially targeted because Muslim families are 
thought to pay higher bribes to prevent women from being detained in cells overnight.80 
Still, it appears that Kenyan authorities are increasingly seeing the value of a softer approach 
to counterterrorism. 81  The government has recently advanced several PCVE efforts to 
prevent radicalization. These include redeployment of ethnic Somali police officers to their 




communities at risk of radicalization. The Ministry of the Interior has implemented a major 
Community Policing Program called Nyumba Kumi, involving clustered households that are 
encouraged to identify and report suspicious activities and “at-risk” individuals. 82  The 
government is also focusing on counter messaging and reintegration of former foreign 
terrorist fighters and Al-Shabab facilitators and sympathizers. 
As part of these PCVE efforts, President Kenyatta launched the National Counter-Violent 
Extremism (“NCVE”) Strategy in September 2016. The strategy was developed through a 
consultative process involving government agencies, civil society, religious leaders, private 
sector, researchers and other regional and international stakeholders.83 The strategy aims 
“to give civil society and Faith Based Organizations an upper hand in fighting extremism and 
terror,” in order to address recruitment and radicalization of vulnerable youth.84 A National 
Counter Radicalization Strategy has also been launched which has seven pillars: “a media 
strategy; psycho-social strategy; faith based strategy; capacity building strategy; political 
strategy; education and security strategies.” 85   The National Counter-Terrorism Centre 
(“NCTC”) is promoting localized implementation action plans for the strategy at the county 
level,86 and has asked UN Women to provide gender training for NCTC officials and to aid in 
establishing a gender desk at NCTC headquarters.87 However, stakeholders have expressed 
concern that the NCVE strategy is gender-neutral and that it lacks a pillar to address the 
unique challenges faced by women as victims, perpetrators and sympathizers of extremism.88 
UN Women, Kenya and Humanity, Activism, Knowledge Integrity (“HAKI”) have made 
efforts to introduce a gender pillar into the strategy.89 
Notwithstanding these advancements, the Kenyan authorities have launched crackdowns in 
recent years against civil society organizations in an effort to counter the financing of 
terrorism. The country’s Non-Governmental Organization Coordination Board deregistered 
sixteen NGOs in December 2014 for suspected, but unsubstantiated, links to terrorists and 
funding of their activities.90 In 2015, a list of “entities suspected to be associated with Al-
Shabaab” was published resulting in the freezing of the organizations’ accounts.91 More 
recently, the government is trying to establish an online portal for registration of all 
individuals and organizations working on the NCVE strategy, which is being resisted by civil 
society in light of these past abuses.92 This has created a difficult climate for civil society 
organizations to operate in.   
NON-GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Several non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) are implementing PCVE programs with 
funding from international donor agencies such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (“USAID”), United States Institute of Peace (“USIP”), and International Civil 
Society Action Network (“ICAN”), among others. Programs range from those that focus on 
countering radicalization, rehabilitating “women left behind,” and protecting the populations 




In Mombasa, African Women Advocating Peace and Security in Africa (“AWAPSA”) and the 
Coastal Education Center (“COEC”) are implementing direct intervention programs funded 
by USIP called Women Against Violence Extremism (“WAVE”).93 WAVE focuses on building 
women’s resilience against violent extremism, supports women by providing psychosocial 
support and economic opportunities, like microfinance, and also provides a forum for female 
students to discuss challenges of combatting extremism in their communities. After Garissa 
students were brought to Mombasa University following the attack, WAVE provided a 
platform for female students to talk about their experiences. The Women’s Initiative for Their 
Empowerment (“WIFE”) is another initiative that focuses on “women left behind.”94 WIFE 
provides psychological support to women and attempts to reintegrate them in the society. 
Other direct intervention programs attempt to bridge gaps between radical and moderate 
youth.95 These programs engage individuals (14 to 30-years-old) who have dropped out of 
school, or are unemployed for other reasons, through sport, debates, and exhibitions, among 
other activities.96 These initiatives may also aid in detecting extremism.  
AWAPSA and HAKI have also pursued media campaigns, via radio, social media, and 
documentaries such as Raise Our Voices where “women left behind” share their experiences 
and stories.97 Other media campaigns include documentaries such as Call Back Home, an 
initiative of COEC, which focuses on youth involved in extremism. 98  Various direct 
interventions programs targeting youth have also been launched in Kenya. These include 
youth mentorship programs providing youth with an alternative forms of guidance. For 
example, RUSI’s Peer Mentorship program pairs former criminals with youth mentees to 
create a peer bond.99 
AWAPSA and others have implemented community policing programs, such as the program 
on women and law enforcement, to improve community relations and to encourage women to 
share information with police, improving the state’s ability to detect extremism. 
In addition, a number of community dialogue programs have been implemented. These 
include programs by HAKI that employ theatre as a way to communicate PCVE messages 
and hold community meetings where community leaders can speak directly with affected 
women.100  APWAPSA has also launched Friend without Borders, an inter-faith dialogue 
between Christian and Muslim women.101 Another program titled Tuna Uwezo—“We Have 
the Power”—aims to “reduce politically-motivated conflict, interethnic violence and sectarian 
violence in the informal settlements in Nairobi” through community dialogue by “targeting 
residents, especially young people, to engage in dialogue, air grievances and work toward 
common resolutions.”102 
Muslim groups in Kenya, such as the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (“SUPKEM”), and 
the Center for Ihsan and Educational Development (“CIED”) are also engaged in conducting 
media campaigns among other initiatives to counter the use of Islam in legitimatizing violent 
extremism activities. 103 As part of these efforts, people are working with the government to 




also involved in capacity building of Muslim scholars and clerics to identify early warning 
signs of radicalization.105 
International organizations in collaboration with government and civil society organizations 
are also implementing PCVE programs. For example, government and UNDP Kenya jointly 
developed the UN Development Assistance Framework (“UNDAF”) 2014–2018.106 United 
Nations agencies in the country are also currently working to develop a unified PCVE 
platform from which to engage government and civil society and launch PCVE programs, 
with UNDP leading the effort.107 
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UNITED STATES COUNTRY PROFILE 
The United States has long been engaged in funding and implementing PCVE around the 
world. However, the implementation of such programs within its own borders has been 
more recent and subject to various concerns from a civil liberties and human rights 
perspective. In 2011, for example, the White House introduced a PCVE program 
exclusively focusing on Muslim communities in Los Angeles, Boston and Minneapolis. 
The program was met with objections and resistance both from Muslim communities and 
from civil society organizations who were concerned that programs targeting Muslims 
would result in increased surveillance and harassment.  
Despite these concerns, Muslim communities have not outright rejected PCVE programs. 
In fact, communities have sometimes implemented their own versions of PCVE programs 
without accessing government funds or resources, in an effort to maintain independence.  
Engagement of women has not been prioritized in current PCVE initiatives, though 
women have been participants and administrators in the programs. This may be because 
women in the U.S. are seen as benefitting from greater levels of equality than in most 
other countries, or because women continue to constitute a minority of recruits and 
participants in violent extremism. Few federal programs contain an explicit focus on 
women. Regardless, women’s roles in PCVE have not been significantly explored as a 
consideration.    
This profile discusses programs managed and funded by both the United States 
government and by civil society to prevent and counter violent extremism. Because the 
United States government has engaged in more expansive programming than Tunisia 
and Kenya and because researchers have been able to access details on this programing, 
this profile will spend more time on United States government-backed efforts than those 
in Tunisia and Kenya.    
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
United States law generally differentiates between self-executing treaties (which 
immediately upon ratification become a part of United States domestic law) and non-self-
executing treaties (which require further Congressional action to be incorporated into 
United States law). Some human rights treaties are self-executing while others are not.  
The United States is a member of the Organization of the American States (“OAS”) and, 
therefore, of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”). Human rights 
obligations are generated by the OAS Charter, the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man, and the American Convention on Human Rights.1 The United States 
is both a party to the Charter and the Declaration but not the Convention. Thus, the 
United States is subject to the American Declaration and the Commission but it does not 
submit to the authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and has not ratified 




In 1980, the United States signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), an international treaty adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly. 2  The treaty calls upon states to eliminate 
discrimination of women in all areas of life, including political life, employment, 
healthcare, and education. Despite signing the treaty, the United States is one of seven 
nations that has not ratified the treaty, thereby not consenting to be bound by the treaty.3 
Primary concerns over the United States’ adherence to CEDAW are around access to 
reproductive and healthcare options, particularly abortion.4  
The United States has signed and ratified the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). It has also signed the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). The Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination recommended that the definition of 
racial discrimination used in state and federal contexts be reviewed.5 The Committee for 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination highlighted the incidence of rape and sexual 
assault, particularly among Native women and migrant domestic workers, as well as 
healthcare disparities between African American women and other demographic groups.6  
The United States is a party to the Convention Against Torture.7 The Committee Against 
Torture provided a number of recommendations in its 2010 report, including allowing 
United Nations Rapporteur’s access to Guantanamo Bay to investigate allegations of 
torture. The Human Rights Committee has also been concerned about the surveillance of 
private communication of individuals by the United States government without proper 
independent oversight.8 The Human Rights Committee and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concerns over the loose definitions of 
terrorism used by the United States, and the lack of constitutional courts adjudicating 
crimes labeled terrorism.9  Further, the Human Rights Committee recommended the 
implementation of a National Human Rights Institution to coordinate adherence to 
human rights treaties at the state, national, and local levels.10 
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE U.S. 
THE MUSLIM AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
According to population estimates from 2015, Muslims make up 1 percent of the United 
States population, and comprise 10 percent of the legal immigrants in the United States.11  
According to a 2014 study by the Congressional Research Service, while 75 percent of 
Americans in the United States express confidence in the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (“FBI”), only 60 percent of Muslim Americans have the same confidence in 
the agency.12 Muslims report being subject to invasive searches while driving and at 
airport security checkpoints, which leads to a sense of alienation from law enforcement 
agencies. 13 This unique and targeted focus on Muslim Americans in the context of PCVE 




This sense of mistrust has likely been worsened by undercover surveillance programs, 
such as the FBI initiative that paid individuals to pose as new Muslim converts at 
mosques to befriend Muslims, in order to provide intelligence on the community. The most 
notorious of these cases, Operation Flex, in California, resulted in the Muslim community 
reporting an FBI agent back to the FBI as a potential terrorist threat to America.15 
Similarly, the mass surveillance program implemented by the New York Police 
Department in the tri-state area collected information about 26 ethnic groups that were 
associated with Islam over several years, but yielded no information related to terrorism 
or extremism.16  
Similarly, the Counter Intelligence program (“COINTELPRO”) of the 1970’s monitored 
many African American groups, including civil rights organizations like the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and religious and political groups like 
the Nation of Islam.17 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
For decades, United States intelligence agencies have monitored groups deemed potential 
threats through the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), and the more recent 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). The DHS was formed in 2002 to unite 35 
intelligence-gathering agencies in one federal department and collects information using 
public-private partnerships and through the use of fusion centers.18 The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, which operates out of the Department of Justice, provides domestic 
intelligence, and leads the Joint Terrorism Task Force.19 The Department of Justice also 
manages United States Attorneys Offices.20 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) was passed in 1978 to regulate 
incursions by intelligence gathering departments after the Church Committee identified 
illegal practices that violated civil liberties like privacy and free speech.21 However, after 
the attacks on September 11, 2001, the FBI expanded its portfolio to include terrorism 
prevention, in addition to its established law enforcement directive, and began to 
contribute to “proactive domestic surveillance.”22 
 This agency shift was coupled with new legislation, including the USA Patriot Act  
(“Patriot Act”), the Homeland Security Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act.23 Many of these acts were meant to bring together existing intelligence 
organizations in order to share information and personnel, as well as to integrate 
enforcement from the state to federal level.24  The sharing of information also reflected a 
new approach to terrorism, in which intelligence organizations attempt to pinpoint and 
prevent attacks before they occur.25 For instance, the Patriot Act expanded the definition 
of terrorism to include domestic terrorism, and as a result, the government has more 




VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
United States government programs use the FBI’s Countering Violent Extremism office’s 
definition of violent extremists as “individuals who support or commit ideologically 
motivated violence to further personal, political or social objectives, sometimes without 
direction from or influence by a foreign actor.”27  Government agencies recognize the 
following factors for violent extremism: politics, religion and economics.28 Government 
agencies have also identified conditions that may facilitate involvement in violent 
extremism such as exposure to social media sites used for recruiting by extremist groups.29 
The United States National Counter Terrorism Center has categorized the primary 
ideologies responsible for attacks in the United States: anarchism, Islamic Extremism, 
Eco terrorism and Right Wing Extremism. Eco terrorists and Right Wing Extremists 
committed 8 percent of extremist attacks between 1995 and 2011.30 Twelve percent of 
attacks during this time period were attributed to Islamic Extremists.31 According to the 
FBI’s record of terrorist attacks, from 1980–2005, 6 percent of incidents were “attributable 
to Muslims.”32  
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism reports 
that 80 percent of terrorist incidents in the United States from 1970–2013 were carried 
out by “nonaffiliated individuals,” the Earth Liberation Front, and the Animal Liberation 
Front. During the 2000’s, less than 2 percent of attacks were from groups that claimed to 
be affiliated with fundamentalist Islam.33  
As noted earlier in this report, one of the difficulties in recording data in terrorist attacks 
is a lack of definitions; the FBI uses domestic terrorism and violent extremism 
interchangeably, affecting the ways in which such cases are prosecuted.34 One particular 
point of focus has been on Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda inspired militants, and more recently 
in preventing individuals from traveling to or receiving instruction from the Islamic State 
(also, “ISIS,” “ISIL” or “Daesh”), otherwise known by its Arabic acronym Dawla al-
Islamyia fil Iraq wa’al Sham.35 
The United States’ intelligence and law enforcement agencies continue to be interested in 
the Muslim community to prevent both domestic terrorism crimes, as well as recruitment 
to foreign extremist organizations. The current emphasis is on preventing American 
participation in ISIS.36 Worldwide an estimated 20,000 fighters have gone to Iraq and 
Syria to fight. Approximately 150 Americans have attempted, some unsuccessfully, to 
reach the region.37 
In another estimate, of the 3.3 million Muslims in America, only 250 have gone overseas 
to join foreign fighter groups. This represents only 0.0075 percent of the Muslim-American 
population.38 This is far less than France, where 0.036 percent of the Muslim-French 
population has attempted to join foreign fighter groups, or Tunisia, where 0.054 percent 
(or 6,000 Muslims out of 11 million) has done the same.39 American Muslims who have 
traveled abroad to participate with extremist organizations have been found to not be 




Muslim social centers.40 Moreover, there is no city or community in the United States with 
a significant concentration of Muslims who have gone abroad to join fighter groups.41 
While the number of American Muslims who joined foreign fighter groups dropped by 40 
percent in 2016, the number of right wing and White Nationalist militia groups has 
grown.42 The Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks hate groups, has reported that 
militia groups have grown over 600 percent between 2008 and 2012.43 The number of 
followers on twitter that right wing groups have been able to accrue also grew by 600 
percent between 2012 and 2016.44 
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE U.S. 
HISTORY OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
The equal rights of women are not provided for in the United States’ founding documents. 
The Declaration of Independence states: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” (emphasis 
added). 45  
The freedom of religion for all is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment state, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-dress of grievances.” 46  The First 
Amendment also provides a legal basis for challenging state regulation of expression, 
including practice, association, and belief.47 
Women’s basic rights have been advanced through various statutes, constitutional 
amendments and court interpretations of women’s constitutional rights. Between 1777 
and 1807, women’s right to vote, which had been practiced in some of the early American 
colonies, was revoked by all states.48 Starting in 1839, states began passing the Married 
Women’s Property Act, allowing women to own and control their own property, a change 
from the inherited British common law of coverture where the husband upon marriage 
subsumed a woman’s rights and property.49 Women were granted the right to vote by the 
19th constitutional amendment in 1919, after decades of lobbying. 50  Women were 
historically denied equal access to education and professions, such as medical school and 
law school. 51 The first women admitted to medical school were not admitted until 1915.52 
The first women governors were not elected until 1925, and the first woman federal judge 
was not appointed until 1928.  
The Equal Rights Amendment, a constitutional amendment that would prohibit 
discrimination against women, was first proposed in 1923, and stated, “[m]en and women 
shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its 
jurisdiction.” In 1972, Congress approved of the Equal Rights Amendment that stated 




by any State on account of sex.”53 To take hold, the amendment had to be ratified by 38 
states, but by 1982 failed to pass by three states.54 The Equal Pay Act was passed in 1963, 
the first federal law that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, followed by the 
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 which protects women in employment, and Title IX in 
1972 which guarantees equal access in education and athletic resources to both genders.55 
In 2009 the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was passed by President Obama, lifting time 
restrictions on the period to file complaints of discrimination related to compensation.56  
CURRENT STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 
Increasing participation of women in policymaking on national security issues has been 
one strategy to developing responsive national security systems. Amy Pope, former 
Deputy Homeland Security Advisor on the White House National Security Council, has 
stated that the participation of women in leadership roles provides additional perspectives 
to agency decisions, more details about experiences unique to women, and a higher level 
of legitimacy for programs that target women.57 
Though women now make up half of the workers in the United States, indicators of 
women’s status in the United States are below men’s in many categories. The United 
States ranks 65th in global wage equality according to the World Economic Forum, with 
women paid 78 percent of what men are paid in similar job positions.58 This disparity 
becomes greater for women of color; black women are paid 64 percent and Latina women 
paid 56 percent compared to white men in similar positions.59 Fifty-six percent of women 
born outside of the United States participate in the labor force.60  In 2016 women held 
fewer than 20 percent of seats in the National House of Representatives and the Senate.61 
The United States is still one of 32 countries that does not have an explicit gender equality 
guarantee in its Constitution.62 Gender disparities in economic status and employment 
vary by state, with lower income states reflecting the largest disparities.  
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM    
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO COUNTERING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM 
The distinction drawn by the United States government between counterterrorism 
programs and PCVE programs is that the latter lack “law enforcement suppression.”63 
Counterterrorism programs target an individual once an individual has decided to engage 
in violence, known as “mobilization.”64 An alternative definition is that counterterrorism 
targets “violent or illegal action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs,” whereas 
PCVE focuses on “radicalization,” described as “the process of acquiring and holding 
radical or extremist beliefs.”65  
Despite having no process to define an individual’s path to violent extremism, the White 
House Strategy includes identifying “warning signs” that someone is “recruited or 
radicalized to violence” and disseminating those signs to family members and friends in 




ranks communities and individuals on risk and protective factors such as neighborhood 
safety, cohesiveness among community members, “experiences of loss,” and “general 
health.”67 However, no studies are cited to back up the use of these factors within the 
study or the level of correlation between the listed factors and violent extremism. 
For this reason, and acknowledging the stigma PCVE programs may carry, government 
agencies implement PCVE programs using existing social services, including public 
health, mental health, and educational agencies.68 The federal government cites three 
models for their approach to violent extremism: (1) the Comprehensive Gang model; 
(2) the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative; and (3) the Building Communities of 
Trust Initiative.69 
The government approach to PCVE posits that certain individuals are more susceptible 
to violent extremism and acknowledges that they cannot currently predict which 
individuals fall into this category. This is seen as an obstacle that can be overcome using 
additional data and resources in a local context.70 The DHS stated in 2016 that it would 
create a research agenda through a searchable library selectively available to domestic 
and international partners by October 2017.71 The National Institute of Justice and the 
Department of Homeland Security are providing funding grants for additional research 
into the topic.72 Since 2012, $14 million has been provided in grant funding to universities, 
research institutes, and hospitals for 28 projects related to domestic radicalization.73 
PCVE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security began to conduct public outreach through 
its Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. While the initial outreach was to 
communicate avenues of redress for potential violations of civil liberties, recent PCVE 
programs have been coordinated through The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
(CRCL) and the DHS Community Engagement Section.74 
Following media reports of bias in PCVE training, a Government Accountability Office 
Report was created on Countering Violent Extremism related training, provided to 28,000 
state and local entities between 2010 and 2011.75 These trainings focused primarily on 
cultural competency or violent extremism, rather than community engagement.76 Many 
of the programs use terms interchangeably when they refer to different concepts: “Islamic 
culture” is often conflated with “Middle Eastern Culture,” “Arab-Americans” are 
construed as “Muslims,” and “Arabic Culture” is conflated with “Islam.”77    
Leadership in Counterterrorism aims to, among other things, familiarize officers with 
various types of United States domestic terrorist groups and educate them on the 
historical development of violent Islamic extremism. This course is taught in a symposium 
format and includes sessions on Middle Eastern culture and basic Islamic beliefs.78 
Several complaints have been filed alleging the trainings or trainers made statements 
that were untrue or discriminatory. Some complaints were accepted as valid and 
particular guest speakers were disinvited from the program.79 One of the complaints was 




stated, “Sunni Muslims have been prolific in spawning numerous and varied 
fundamentalist extremist terrorist organizations. Sunni core doctrine and end state have 
remained the same and they continue to strive for Sunni Islamic domination of the 
world.”80 The FBI reviewed the statement and determined, “the materials to, among other 
things, conform to constitutional principles, adhere to the FBI’s core values, be tailored to 
the intended audience, and focused to ensure message clarity.”81  
2011 PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM STRATEGY 
In 2011, the United States launched a formal PCVE strategy titled Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (the “White House plan”).82 
The program focuses on the threats by “Al Qa’ida and affiliate networks”83  through 
interventions by local officials and communities using resources from the federal 
government to create PCVE capacity. The program is led by Attorney Generals and 
implemented through federal agencies, the DHS, FBI, the United States Agency for 
International Development, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Departments 
of Defense, Justice, Education, Health and Human Services, and Labor.84  
The 2017 fiscal year budget for the Department of Justice program is $4 million for 
research, $6 million for local PCVE models, $2 million for technical assistance, and $3 
million for demonstration models of these projects in which law enforcement partner with 
local stakeholders.85 The Department of Homeland Security has $50 million to respond to 
threats of violent extremism, which includes PCVE programming.86 The Department of 
Homeland Security also appointed a full time PCVE coordinator. Grant programs that are 
not specific to PCVE are provided through the DHS Urban Areas Security Initiative and 
the DOJ Community Oriented Policing Services Program.87 
The goals of the program have been listed as: “(1) enhancing engagement with and support 
to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government 
and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering 
violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.”88 
89 
The activities explicitly taken on by the federal government are research funding, best 
practice development, issuing grants and building connections with stakeholders.90 Civil 




CHALLENGES IN DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
Without clear models for what constitutes violent extremism, it is difficult to implement 
an assessment program to track the effectiveness of PCVE efforts.92 In his closing remarks 
at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former President Barack Obama stated, 
“by ‘violent extremism,’ we don’t just mean the terrorists who are killing innocent people. 
We also mean the ideologies, the infrastructure of extremists—the propagandists, the 
recruiters, the funders who radicalize and recruit or incite people to violence.”93 
Defining violent extremism has been an ongoing challenge for PCVE programs in other 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, where the number of outreach efforts may be 
tallied, but not the effect of the efforts. 94  Standardizing any metrics will also be a 
challenge given the different programs implemented and approaches taken for each. The 
DHS plans to review their 2016 strategy every three years, starting in 2019, to determine 
what successful programs are and what improvements should be made and to develop 
metrics to measure these factors in 2017.95 However, variance in approaches and a lack 
of consistent definitions are likely to make this a challenge. 
The goal of the DHS-lead program is to target religious leaders, civil society, and youth 
using social media and community interventions to prevent “individuals who support or 
commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals”.96 The White House 
provided no definitive model by which people become engaged in violent extremism, 
noting “there is not [a] single pathway to violent extremism.”97 The White House stated 
that to counter violent extremism is to “disrupt efforts to recruit, radicalize and mobilize 
followers” by addressing conditions and reducing factors that contribute to violence.98 The 
program calls for integration of PCVE into existing programs such as public safety and 
violence prevention.99  
PCVE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
The White House plan explicitly states that PCVE efforts do not include intelligence 
gathering or investigations for criminal prosecution. 100  However, as part of federal 
research into PCVE, the federal government has indicated they will make open-source 
datasets for government departments to broaden understanding of behaviors related to 
violent extremism.101  
An additional portion of this program is the utilization of “fusion centers,” which are two 
or more government agencies that exchange resources and information to “detect, prevent, 
investigate and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”102 Owned and run by state and 
local government entities, fusion centers receive and share classified and unclassified 
information from federal partners.103  Among their capabilities are to “build grassroots 
intelligence and analytic capabilities” and “providing threat analysis.”104 Fusion centers 
have become “all hazard” centers, which also monitor organized crime, immigration and 
natural disasters.105 The White House plan includes coordination between fusion centers, 
local law enforcement and communities to help identify “suspicious activity” and for the 




standards for the operation of fusion centers, and currently only 16 of 58 have adopted 
the voluntary Fusion Center Guidelines promulgated by the federal government. 107 
Without these provisions, it is unknown if fusion centers are abiding by statutes like the 
1974 Privacy Act, which protects against the collection of information for citizens who 
have not committed a crime.108 
BOSTON, LOS ANGELES AND MINNEAPOLIS PILOT PROGRAMS 
In 2013, former Attorney General Eric Holder announced the PCVE grant targeting 
Muslim communities and in March 2014 the selected cities of Boston, Los Angeles and 
Minneapolis were announced as pilot programs.109 Each city was selected to test different 
approaches: a social-level approach in Minneapolis aimed at the large Somali-American 
population: community-engagement in Los Angeles; and individual interventions in 
Boston.110 The goal of the pilot program is to pilot a number of the DHS initiatives, 
evaluate their effectiveness, and expand the program to other prioritized cities and 
regions in the United States.111 
Each of the initial cities was provided a framework by the United States Attorney’s office 
that reflected input from community and government stakeholders. The framework is to 
be used as a flexible set of guidelines, with goals and solutions, to assist in the 
implementation of each city’s program. 112  One notable program recommendation is 
delivery of social services to participating individuals. These include language and civics 
classes, culturally sensitive education, mental health services, and youth programs.113 In 
2017, the DHS will provide a self-assessment to communities to understand the threat of 
violent extremism in their communities, with the results used by the community partners 
and the DHS.114 
These PCVE programs have been criticized for lack of funding, lack of coordination, and 
lack of buy in by targeted communities.115 Some have noted that negative community 
reactions have been caused by the government’s failure to solicit input from stakeholders 
that reflect the Muslim community’s racial and economic diversity.116 The community 
outreach done was criticized for focusing on the most well-connected Muslims rather than 
marginalized segments of the population, like those who would require government aid 
for mental services.  
Intelligence agencies involved in the program have both asked for additional resources, 
and have not had formal mechanisms on how to coordinate with each other.117 The lack of 
programming focusing on any other groups, particularly right wing nationalist groups, 
further contributes to the perception of the program as biased and ineffective for the 
overall goal of preventing violent extremism.  
THE BOSTON FRAMEWORK 
The framework for the Boston program emphasizes “prevention and intervention” and is 
aimed at building the resilience and capacity of communities to discourage members to 




seeks to address, such as alienation of youth, distrust between authorities and Muslim 
communities, lack of knowledge about Islam in mainstream American culture, and the 
use of social media in recruitment. 119   For each of the seven “problems” identified, 
proposed solutions are listed. For example, problem 1 is the fact that alienated and 
disaffected youth are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist 
organizations. Some potential solutions are offered include working with schools and faith 
based organization to assist youth in developing critical and conflict resolution skills, 
developing programs to promote civic engagement, and increasing mental health services 
for youth. 120  Programs are meant to be integrated in environments apart from law 
enforcement, such as academic and social work environments, and coordinated by the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts.121    
Despite engagement of academia and other non-government sectors, the program was met 
with some dissent. The Executive Director of the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural 
Center (“ISBCC”)122 refused to sign on to the program because the PCVE programs singled 
out the Muslim community and reinforced stereotypes about the American Muslim 
community as inherently violent, rather than providing social services to all 
demographics within the city who would benefit from them.123   
THE LOS ANGELES FRAMEWORK 
The Los Angeles framework begins by emphasizing civil rights and civil liberties, and 
specifies the three pillars of the program as “prevention, intervention, and interdiction.”124 
Prevention is oriented towards the community, intervention for the individual, and 
interdiction for disrupting a “criminal threat.”125 Again the PCVE framework centers on 
American Muslim populations.  
The first Department of Homeland Security Office for Strategic Engagement was 
established in Los Angeles in conjunction with the city’s Human Relations Commission in 
2008.126 This later became the Interagency Coordination Group, consisting of the Sheriff’s 
Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Human Relations Commission, the United 
States Attorney’s Office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, California Department 
of Justice, United States Citizenship and Immigration Service, the Transportation 
Security Administration, and the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health.127 
Working with non-governmental agencies, Los Angeles has also conducted town hall 
meetings, community awareness briefings and training seminars for hate crimes and 
domestic violence. Private sector partners have engaged social media to advocate against 
violent extremism. The framework acknowledges that civic society-oriented programs do 
not exclusively advance goals of PCVE programs, rather they strengthen communities 
overall. The framework acknowledges the difficult dynamics between civil society and 
Muslim American groups and law enforcement, due to the stigma attached to the 
program, and the risk of surveillance.128 However, the framework reiterates that the 





THE MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL FRAMEWORK 
The framework in the twin cities of Minneapolis-St. Paul notes that the large number of 
Somali immigrants are peaceful but also sets forth the timeline of recruitment of young 
Somali Minnesotans by Al-Shabaab, the Somali military group designated as a terrorist 
organization.129 The United States District Court of Minnesota has thus far convicted 
twenty Somalis on terrorism charges. 130  The framework aims, like the Los Angeles 
framework, to be community driven, relying on existing relationships like the Hennepin 
County Sheriff Office’s relationship with the Somali Advisory Council, the St. Paul Police 
Department’s community engagement team, and federal youth advisory boards with 
Somali youth.131 
After a period of community feedback, the root causes of “radicalization” (a term never 
defined in the framework) were identified as: disaffected youth, identity crisis, community 
isolation, lack of opportunity, and a disconnect between youth and religious leaders.132 
The model adopted to address PCVE is “engagement, prevention and intervention,” 
adopted from public safety models like the Gang Reduction Model.133 “Engagement” seeks 
to increase relationships between law enforcement and youth, by increasing the number 
of personnel oriented towards the community. “Prevention” aims to increase resources 
provided to the Somali American population, and “intervention” targets schools and the 
greater community with youth workers. 






PROGRAMMATIC CONCERNS OF PCVE PROGRAMS 
Each of the above frameworks begins by summarizing anticipated critiques—the singling 
out of Muslims, potential weakening of civil liberties for Muslims, and increase in 
securitization of those communities. However, each framework has still been the subject 
of criticism by civil society organizations on those very grounds. The primary challenge 
appears to be the implementation of these programs by law enforcement, despite attempts 
to create more community policing models within these authorities. The Congressional 
Research Service evaluated the 2011 and 2014 White House PCVE Plans and identified 
that the processes by which Muslim American groups were being selected were opaque, 
with no comprehensive list of currently operating grant programs.135 This was seen as 
contributing to the impression that PCVE programs were for intelligence gathering 




of the programs for at-risk individuals, or definitions for violent extremist narratives, 
making it difficult for coordinating agencies to implement proposed programs.136 
Two of the frameworks above reference women specifically. The Los Angeles framework 
states that the third challenge in implementation is “expanding and enhancing 
engagement efforts with women and youth so that stronger partnerships and leadership 
can be developed within those groups.”137 The Minneapolis-St. Paul framework suggests 
utilizing “mothers” to be an intervention individual in the program.138  These are the only 
mentions of women specifically as program leaders, participants or targets.   
MUSLIM-COMMUNITY DESIGNED PCVE PROGRAMS 
As mentioned above, apart from United States government lead programs, Muslim civil 
society groups have developed their own models with varying levels of collaboration with 
the federal and local government. 
WORDE MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
World Organization for Resource Development and Education (“WORDE”) is a community 
led private-public PCVE program in Montgomery County, Maryland. Montgomery County 
Executive Office of Community Partnerships executed the program through its Faith 
Community Working Group. At its start, the program was funded by the county and 
received additional funding from the Department of Justice through the Community 
Oriented Policing Services grant program. The program focused on an “early-warning 
system” which trains community members and law enforcement to “identify” individuals 
at-risk for violent extremism and facilitates interventions through faith centers and social 
service organizations.139 
WORDE focused on a gang prevention model, utilizing five risk factors: economic 
deprivation, political grievances, psychological factors, social factors, and lack of 
education. Taking a more nuanced approach than many government models, the 
organization does not present “a single profile of what makes someone a terrorist,” in 
particular referencing the lack of empirical studies that conclusively demonstrate a 
“radicalization” path.140  
Another program associated with the WORDE model is the Crossroads Program, which 
explicitly targets residents “from the Middle East, South Asia and North/East/West 
Africa.” Offering culturally sensitive counseling, the program gives a “treatment plan” for 
ideological, psychological, economic and sociological risk factors. The Crossroads Program 
utilizes pre and post quantitative and qualitative assessments in conjunction with the 
University of Maryland.    
MPAC SAFE SPACES 
The Muslim Public Affairs Council (“MPAC”) has provided its own PCVE framework in 
its toolkit titled “Safe Spaces.” The toolkit seeks to offer a community alternative to the 




members of the Muslim American community, it believes it is best situated to address the 
concerns of the American Muslim community.142  
The toolkit itself provides a two-step intervention model, prevention and intervention. 
The Prevention prong emphasizes the development of “safe spaces” within Muslim 
American communities, in particular for Muslim youth, where any topic, including those 
that may be considered taboo, can be discussed openly. This safe space should also provide 
opportunities for political participation, adult mentorship, interfaith partnerships and 
digital literacy. The steps detailed for the intervention portion of the toolkit include 
securing legal counsel, developing an evaluation team, conducting an assessment of 
potential situations, and finally calling law enforcement if necessary. The toolkit includes 
limited guidelines on state duty to protect laws, other organizations to contact, and 
religious sources for countering violence.143 
The program is adopted voluntarily by community groups and Islamic Centers, and 
facilitates programs deemed necessary to the community. The program focuses on psycho-
social needs of individuals within the Muslim community, often younger individuals, but 
not exclusively so. 144 
EDVENTURES NEXT GEN 
Gen Next Foundation, based in Newport Beach, California, was founded by a group to 
fight terrorism online. Gen Next works with online programs like Google for the “redirect 
method.” The redirect method redirects searchers on websites like YouTube to anti-ISIS 
messages when the service detects someone is seeking out information related to the 
group.145 For example, if an individual searches for an ISIS-related video, a suggested 
video will appear in which young people discuss the brutal conditions under a Daesh 
controlled territory.146 
OPPOSITION TO PCVE PROGRAMS 
SECURITIZATION OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY 
In some European countries, government officials have begun to reassess and dismantle 
community targeting PCVE programs that have been implemented for a decade. The high 
costs associated with prevention programs and the difficulty in assessing their 
effectiveness have made them less appealing to law enforcement authorities. As an 
alternative, an individual-focused intervention model has become more popular, since it 
is far easier and cheaper to target an individual than entire communities.147 The language 
of “safeguarding” has been adopted rather than “prevention” or “countering.”148 Similarly, 
the term “countering violent extremism” itself has been questioned. Some, like Duke 
University Professor Jayne Huckerby, find that the term is associated with a policy of 
securitization, rather than community resiliency or peace-building initiatives. 149 
Huckerby argues that building community is the true goal of PCVE programs, a goal 




Despite the commitments made by the PCVE designers to “a commitment to work through 
an inclusive process that will not polarize communities,” the White House’s Countering 
Violent Extremism program was not well received by Muslim Americans or civil society 
groups. 151  The Brennan Center for Justice, a well-respected public policy and law 
institute, stated that such programs are based on insufficient evidence that markers used 
to identify radicalization are empirically justified.152 Furthermore, it is not guaranteed 
that those who harbor “radical” thoughts will follow through with them or that those who 
commit terrorism do so for ideological reasons.153 Since there is no linear pathway to 
extremism, it is difficult to identify when behavior is indicative of risk factors, or normal, 
particularly in adolescents.154 Further, there is no data to suggest that Muslim-American 
violent extremists have a distinct demographic profile.155 
In contrast, the targeting of Muslim populations has been noted to overlap with and 
undermine community cohesion work by stigmatizing this particular community. 156 
Increasing hate crimes against Muslims has heightened concern of stigmatization and 
marginalization for Muslim communities.157 That current PCVE government programs 
target Muslim groups exclusively is arguably discriminatory, since right wing militia 
groups are actually responsible for the majority of violent extremism.158 The existing 
community outreach elements of the programs appear token to some, rather than 
substantive program components.159 Further, according to nationwide surveys, 55 percent 
of Muslim men and 42 percent of Muslim women find that no Muslim-American 
organization “represents their interests.”160 Finding local organizations with which to 
effectively partner is difficult where such organizations have not made sufficient inroads 
into the larger Muslim community in America. 
Farah Pandith, former Special Representative to Muslim Communities the United States 
Department of State, described the dilemma as, “[d]ay in and day out we're trying to build 
a community, saying you're part and parcel of the American fabric. You are an American 
citizen. I raise my girls and say they have the same rights as others. The fact is, when 
you're going to come present a program and say it's specially geared to prevent growing 
extremism in the Muslim community, you're by default saying my community is more 
predisposed to extremism. It sets people off.”161 
As one government accountability report suggests, outreach appears to be more effective 
when the Muslim community initiates it and when local government authorities, like a 
Mayor’s office, collaborate instead of the federal government.162 However, the success of 
the collaboration is also dependent on the history and relationship between the 
implementing agency and the community. Programs like the New York Police 
Department’s surveillance of Muslim communities, which were defended by Michael 




CIVIL LIBERTIES OBJECTIONS TO PCVE PROGRAMS 
As noted in a Congressional Research Service Report on Countering Violent Extremism, 
the White House’s Strategy to bolster counter-narratives to violent extremism inevitably 
means PCVE will be sifting through acceptable and unacceptable narratives and 
ideologies.164 It is unclear whether the PCVE strategy will require a creation of a counter-
narrative by federal authorities rather than selecting among current strategies.165 A DHS 
objective for the end of 2017 was to work with community partners to distribute 
“community generated content that counters violent extremism narratives.”166 Further, it 
is difficult to understand how the program will be implemented with no clear definition 
of an extremist “narrative.”167 
Moreover, these programs do not create boundaries between intelligence gathering and 
community support, allowing for intelligence collected from PCVE programs to be later 
used in criminal prosecution.168 The use of government informants in previous programs 
has created an impression that PCVE programs are part of a broader entrapment effort.169 
Informants within the Muslim community are often active in community dynamics, 
offering hypothetical violent schemes that would not otherwise be in circulation within a 
community.170  
Civil liberties advocates have pointed out the tension in PCVE programs. Maher Hathout 
of the Muslim Public Affairs council, for example, noted, [p]eople cannot be suspects and 
partners at the same time.”171  Similarly, the 2011 Government Accountability Office 
report describes the tension when U.S. Attorneys both act as community liaisons while 
maintaining their roles as chief prosecutors in terrorism cases.172 In a survey of United 
States Attorneys taken in 2016, 44 percent of offices received training on community 
outreach and engagement for PCVE and one third of United States Attorney’s offices 
provided local authorities training on outreach to communities for PCVE efforts.173 This 
is contrasted with 71 percent of United States attorney’s offices that have conducted 
outreach and engagement against extremism related to ISIS and Al Qaeda for local 
communities.174 Ninety-six percent of United States Attorney’s Offices collaborated with 
the FBI for outreach efforts, but 94 percent of offices received no additional funding to 
implement outreach and engagement programs.175 
Quintan Wiktorowicz, the White House advisor who formerly oversaw government PCVE 
policy, told Politico, “[i]f you think about the roles and responsibilities of United States 
Attorneys, they can’t possibly take on that function in a really robust way.” 176 Todd 
Gallinger of the Council of American Islamic Relations stated, "[p]rosecutors: They get 
gold stars for not being amazing community liaisons; they get gold stars for putting people 
in jail.” 
Evidence indicates that the FBI has already used “mosque outreach” sessions for 
intelligence gathering. Files on mosque outreach documents have been heavily redacted, 
but still indicate that the meetings document the identities of congregants, their religious 





Civil liberty groups argue that similar programs could be utilized to stymy other 
unpopular groups, including activists and protestors. PCVE programs could be employed 
to gather intelligence on their activities, restricting first amendment practices of free 
speech and gatherings.178 Even the identified first step of radicalization in the PCVE 
program, adoption of beliefs and association with like-minded people, is a protected first 
amendment activity.179 Consistent with this concern, the American Civil Liberties Union 
filed a Freedom of Information Access injunction in February 2016 for more information 
about civil liberties and equal protection safeguards in PCVE programs.180  
As a result of these objections, some Muslim community groups have been resistant to 
participating in PCVE programs. University chapters of the Muslim Students 
Associations have hired “anti PCVE Campaign Managers” and the Council of American 
Islamic Relations has directed mosques to not participate with the implementation.181  
The California chapter of the Council for American Islamic Relations cited concerns with 
the lack of transparency for the White House PCVE program. The five questions 
surrounding the program include why the three cities were selected as targets and how 
much money will be allocated to these programs besides the explicit grant programs.182 
Since the Trump administration, four community groups that had previously applied for 
federal funding under PCVE programming have subsequently refused the grants. Much 
of the new opposition is in response to the Trump administration rhetoric focusing on 
Muslims as a unique extremist threat.183 If the strategic implementation plan requires 
that groups are receptive and cooperative with law enforcement, the level of opposition, 
lack of transparency and unanswered critiques means the current program is likely 
unsustainable and unlikely to proceed successfully utilizing the necessary range of 
community partnerships. 
PROGRAMS PROMOTING GENDER EQUALITY AND INVOLVING WOMEN 
AS STAKEHOLDERS 
Within this problematic context, women have not been a focus of government run 
programming or civil society managed responses. As noted by WORDE, this may be 
reflective of the integrated presence of women within United States programming.184 The 
integration of women in the Department of Homeland Security, as Attorney Generals, and 
as community liaisons exists without explicit policies promoting their participation. 
Though programs funded by the United States government have a focus on Muslim 
communities, no program focuses on gender as a factor in their implementation. It is 
arguable that the focus of such programming has been on disaffected male youth directly 
rather than familial and community relationships involving women or the increasing 
recruitment of women in violent extremist organizations. Regardless, United States 
programs make little effort to explore the role of women in PCVE and so have missed an 
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